'Hell To Pay' Sheds New Light On A-Bomb Decision
'Hell To Pay' Book Cover
The atomic bombs that ended World War II killed — by some estimates — more than 200,000 people. In the decades since 1945, there has been a revisionist debate over the decision to drop the bombs.
Did the U.S. decide to bomb in order to avoid a land invasion that might have killed millions of Americans and Japanese? Or did it drop the bomb to avoid the Soviet army coming in and sharing the spoils of conquering Japan? Were the prospects of a land invasion even more destructive than the opening of the nuclear age?
D.M. Giangreco, formerly an editor for Military Review, has taken advantage of declassified materials in both the U.S. and Japan to try to answer those questions. He talks with NPR's Scott Simon about his new book, Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947.
(Keystone, MPI/Getty Images)
Estimating Casualties
As U.S. military planners contemplated a land invasion of Japan in 1943, military units were being held back from possible action in Berlin because it was understood that they would have to be sent to the Pacific.
"There was a very, very tight timetable," Giangreco says. There were "clearly not enough forces in the Pacific."
The participation of other Allied forces in a Pacific invasion would have been limited — Great Britain, France, Canada and the Soviet Union had been fighting the war longer than the United States. They had just won, and they were ready to get back to normal life.
American military planners estimated that the invasion of Japan would "functionally be a duplication of the casualty surge in Europe," Giangreco explains. And that was "not a pleasant prospect."
American war planners projected that a land invasion of Japan could cost the lives of up to a million U.S. soldiers and many more Japanese. These figures, Giangreco explains, were estimated based on terrain, the number of units fielded, and the number of enemy units they would have to fight.
"Around 1944," Giangreco says, "they ultimately came to the conclusion that the casualties on the low end would be somewhere around the neighborhood of a quarter-million, and on the upper end, in through the million range."
The Difference Between Defeat And Surrender
The invasions and battles at Okinawa and Iwo Jima were ruinous for the Japanese, but Giangreco describes how the Americans and the Japanese derived completely different conclusions from the same conflicts. The Americans extrapolated that the battles were bloody and costly — but in the end it was worth it because they thought the Japanese understood that the U.S. would prevail. The Japanese looked at those same casualties and felt the loss of life was worth it because it sent a message to the Americans that the Japanese were prepared to suffer casualties at a rate the Americans were not.
Some historians argue that Japan was already essentially defeated in 1945, even if it didn't know that. Giangreco says there is a lot to that argument but that "defeat and surrender are two very different things."
Giangreco suspects it would have been much harder to convince the Japanese to surrender than it was to convince the Germans.
"The Germans at least surrendered in very large numbers when they saw a hopeless situation," he says. The only time large numbers of Japanese troops laid down their arms was in Manchuria, when Emperor Hirohito ordered them to surrender.
'I Was Terrified At What Might Happen.'
The appendix of Hell To Pay includes a 1995 letter written by Tales of the South Pacific author James Michener. He refused to allow the letter to be released until after his death. Originally from a Quaker background, Michener was a man of peace, but he stated that he could see no other alternative to the end of World War II.
"I know that if I went public with my views, I would be condemned and ridiculed," Michener wrote. "But I stood there on the lip of the pulsating volcano, and I know that I was terrified at what might happen and damned relieved when the invasion became unnecessary. I accept the military estimates that at least 1 million lives were saved, and mine could have been one of them."
Giangreco says that many Americans and Japanese lives were saved by avoiding a land invasion of Japan.
"It's astounding," he says. "While we were looking at some of our own casualty estimates, the Japanese military was doing much the same thing, and the figure of 20 million appears again and again."
Giangreco says just the number "20 million" is horrific — but he is most stunned by the casualness with which it was used by Japanese military leaders who felt that the loss of life was worth it.
9(MDAyNzUwMDI2MDEyNTA3MTU5NzcyNTQyNA004))
SCOTT SIMON, host:
This is WEEKEND EDITION from NPR News. I'm Scott Simon.
The atomic bombs that ended World War II killed over a hundred, perhaps over 200,000 people. Over the past generation there's been a revisionist debate: Did the United States drop two atomic bombs to avoid a land invasion that might have killed a million Americans and millions of Japanese? Or did they drop the bomb to avoid the Soviet army coming in and sharing the spoils of conquering Japan, or for some other geopolitical goal? Were the prospects of a land invasion even more destructive than the opening of the nuclear age?
D.M. Giangreco, who is an editor for Military Review, has written a new book that takes advantage of declassified materials in both the United States and Japan to try to answer those questions. It's published by the Naval Institute Press and called "Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947."
Mr. Giangreco joins us from member station KCUR in Kansas City, Missouri.
Thanks so much for being with us.
Mr. D.M. GIANGRECO (Author, "Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947"): Oh, glad to be here.
SIMON: Help us understand what U.S. military planners had to look at, as they contemplated a land invasion of Japan in 1940, let's say 1943. Because as you suggest in this book, there were even some military units that were U.S. units that were held back from possible action in Berlin because it was understood they'd have to be sent to the Pacific.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Right. There was a very, very tight timetable. And everything had to work in terms of shipping, you know, the movement of troops because there was clearly not enough forces in the Pacific to be able to carry this off, and...
SIMON: And maybe we should explain, at least at that point in their planning, the participation of other Allied forces would've been limited, including Great Britain, France, Canada, for that matter the Soviet Union, because they had been fighting the war longer than the United States and they had just won, and had to get back to life.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Well, yes. That's exactly right. What they were essentially looking at for the invasion of Japan was what would functionally be a duplication of the casualty surge in Europe that was principally, you know, driven by combat in Europe, that that would be repeated in the Pacific. And that was not a pleasant prospect.
SIMON: Let me get to another aspect, if I could. In history it is often said that war planners had projected that a land invasion of Japan would've cost the lives of a million U.S. soldiers and many more Japanese. Where does that figure come from and does it seem right to you?
Mr. GIANGRECO: Well, you have to remember that these figures are basically put together by planning staffs' best guess from, you know, say, the terrain, the number of units that are going to be fielded; the number of enemy units that they're going to have to fight. And as early as middle part of 1944, when we started getting a pretty firm grasp of just how casualties were playing out, and they ultimately came to the conclusion that the casualties on the low end would be somewhere in the neighborhood, perhaps of, say, about a quarter-million and on the upper end, in through the million range.
SIMON: Someone who reads your book is struck time and time again how the Americans and the Japanese looked at the same experience and derived totally different conclusions. The invasion and battles of Okinawa and Iwo Jima were ruinous in terms of casualties for the Japanese, even more than the Americans. The Americans extrapolated from that information well, the battles were bloody and costly but in the end it was worth it because the Japanese now understand that we are going to prevail.
The Japanese looked at those same numbers and said, well, the battles were bloody and costly but they were worth it because it gave us more time to prepare for the defense of our homeland and the Americans must know are prepared to suffer casualties at a rate that they are not.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Yes. These are the same people who after two atomic bombs and the Russian entry into the war were still saying, no, we can do this because we're still going be able to like force them to invade, because they surely can't have more atomic bombs.
SIMON: What about the argument, Mr. Giangreco, that in 1945 Japan was essentially defeated, even if they didn't know it?
Mr. GIANGRECO: Well, certainly there's a lot to that argument. But defeat and surrender are two very different things. Like if you use...
SIMON: The point of that being a nation might be defeated but until they surrender that perception is kind of useless.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Well, yes. I think that it's quite reasonable to argue that they would've been even harder to convince than the Germans. The Germans at least surrendered in fairly large numbers when they saw a hopeless situation, but the only time you ended up getting large numbers of Japanese to surrender was basically in Manchuria when the emperor said surrender now. And for the first time in the war you actually started getting, you know, large numbers of Japanese laying down their arms.
SIMON: In your appendix, toward the end of the book, you have a very moving letter written by James Michener.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Oh, yes.
SIMON: The novelist who we sometimes forget began his writing career, Tales of the South Pacific, which was made, of course, into a famous musical ultimately - James Michener was from a Quaker background. He was a man of peace. And he wrote a letter, October 20, of 1995, essentially saying there was no alternative to the end of World War II the way the U.S. ended. But he didnt let that letter be released until after his death, did he?
Mr. GIANGRECO: Well, no. It - much to the frustration of a couple of friends of his but for his own personal reasons, he really did not feel that he could let his views be public.
SIMON: He says in this letter, I know that if I went public with my views I would condemned and ridiculed. But recollecting his time in the South Pacific, he said, I stood there on the lip of the pulsating volcano and I know that I was terrified at what might happen and damn relieved when the invasion became unnecessary. I accept the military estimates that at least one million lives were saved and mine could have been one of them.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Yet theres a lot of Americans and Japanese who are alive today because we did not have to go in. Its astounding. While we were looking at some of our own casualty estimates, the Japanese military was doing much the same thing. And the figure of 20 million appears again and again.
SIMON: Twenty million Japanese who would have been killed.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Yes well, in some references it is to Japanese killed and others it is to casualties, but yes, the numbers are horrific but the casualness with which it was used and they felt it was worth it. Its just stunning to me when you go through some of this material.
SIMON: Mr. Giangreco, thanks so much.
Mr. GIANGRECO: Youre welcome.
SIMON: D. M. Giangreco, the author of Hell To Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-1947. He joined us from member station KCUR in Kansas City, Missouri. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright National Public Radio.
