Mine Disaster Probe Finds Intimidation, False Papers
Choosing safety over production was a firing offense at Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch coal mine, according to a federal investigation of last year's deadly explosion there.
Investigators reported Wednesday on the progress of their ongoing, 15-month-long probe. They provided new documentation of how low-level managers who made safety a priority were intimidated and, in some cases, dismissed.
The federal Mine Safety and Health Administration also reported alleged instances of falsification of official safety reports and referred those cases to the Justice Department for possible criminal prosecution.
Those are the fresh findings in detailed presentations provided to the public and reporters Wednesday, and to the families of the disaster's 29 victims Tuesday night. A formal final report is not expected until October at the earliest.
Most of the agency's conclusions mirror earlier preliminary reports and the findings of an independent investigative team last month. The Upper Big Branch explosion, MSHA reported, is blamed on excessive and explosive coal dust, poor air flow underground, seeping and explosive methane gas, failed and disabled safety systems and a corporate culture that appeared to make coal production a priority even when dangerous conditions existed.
But MSHA also documented a pattern of intimidation at the mine. According to Kevin Stricklin, the coal mine safety chief at the agency:
-- upper management threatened to fire front-line supervisors for not meeting production goals
-- safety hazards, such as insufficient air, were not acceptable excuses for not "running" or digging coal
-- a section foreman was fired for delaying production for about an hour to fix ventilation problems
-- one of the Upper Big Branch victims was told, "If you can't go up there to run coal just bring your [lunch] bucket outside and go home."
That victim was 50-year-old Dean Jones, a veteran crew boss who tried to keep his men out of the mine when dangerous conditions existed, "because I told him to," said his widow, Gina, who spoke after the family briefing Tuesday night.
"I said, 'They don't live your life. They don't care about you,' " Gina Jones recalled, as she tried to stifle tears. "I said, 'You've got family.' I said, 'Worry about yourself and your men.' "
Gina Jones says Dean Jones didn't quit his job because the family worried about replacing medical coverage for their 14-year-old son, Kyle, who has cystic fibrosis.
More Than One Set Of Books
Stricklin also disclosed new evidence that Massey officials hid safety problems from federal mine safety inspectors. Internal company production documents obtained by investigators detail serious safety problems at Upper Big Branch that were not disclosed in official safety reports mandated by federal law.
"It's not a problem for a mine operator if they want to keep more than one set of books. That's the prerogative," Stricklin says. "But what they have to do is record the hazards of an examination underground in the official record book. And we found that wasn't the case here."
Safety examinations underground must be conducted during every work shift, and safety problems and corrections must be noted. The examination books warn later shifts of dangers and the need for fixes. And they are reviewed by mine safety inspectors so they can spot areas underground that require extra scrutiny.
Massey Energy is no longer a free-standing corporate entity. The company was absorbed by Alpha Natural Resources in a friendly takeover June 1.
"Our goal isn't to defend the way Massey did things in the past," says Alpha spokesman Ted Pile, "but to make sure things are done right in the future, Alpha's way."
Pile says Alpha will review "all findings from all sources ... this will take time."
"Alpha's way" is tied to a safety program called "Running Right," but Alpha has had trouble distancing itself from Massey because the company has kept on the payroll former Massey managers responsible for some of the company's most troubled mines.
That includes Massey executives Chris Blanchard and Jason Whitehead, who had direct corporate responsibility for Upper Big Branch. NPR has learned and Alpha has now confirmed that Blanchard and Whitehead have new positions at Alpha.
They are "in technical support positions and they have no direct line responsibility for our mining operations," Pile says.
Former Massey CEO Chris Adkins had been picked to help run Alpha's Running Right program, but Adkins left after members of Congress, the United Mine Workers of America and an independent investigative report on Upper Big Branch considered the appointment inappropriate given Massey's safety record under Adkins.
The new developments reported by MSHA triggered a fresh round of Massey condemnations.
In referring to MSHA's conclusions, U.S. Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) wrote, "Massey engaged in coordinated efforts to intimidate workers and prevent them from blowing the whistle on the pervasive safety hazards that ultimately killed 29 miners in West Virginia."
UMWA President Cecil Roberts was equally direct, saying, "MSHA's revelation that there were two sets of books kept at the mine where information about safety issues were recorded demonstrates the utter contempt for mine safety and health laws that was pervasive throughout the entire management structure at Massey Energy."
But there is nothing in MSHA's findings that is critical of MSHA's own regulatory oversight. That bothers Clay Mullins, a coal miner whose brother Rex died at Upper Big Branch.
"It's MSHA's job and the state's job to enforce the law and make sure that Massey does their job," Mullins says. "And all three failed at their job. If they had enforced the laws that they had, then we wouldn't be sitting here talking because the accident would not have happened."
In response to questions from reporters, Stricklin noted that a separate Labor Department investigation is considering any possible regulatory failures at MSHA, which has been criticized in past internal agency and disaster reports for failing at times to rigorously enforce mine safety law.
Coal miner Bobbie Pauley anticipated the MSHA findings with both excitement and dread. Pauley's fiance, Boone Payne, died at Upper Big Branch.
"I kept thinking, 'You've waited over a year. You wanted answers. Tonight [Tuesday], you're going to get them,' " Pauley says. "But then another side of me said, 'I don't want to know because it brings it all back in your face.' "
There's plenty of opportunity for more of that. MSHA expects to release a final written report as early as October. A federal grand jury has been considering criminal indictments. The state of West Virginia will have its own report, as will the UMWA.
But Pauley says she cries every day, anyway, about losing the man she thought she'd be with the rest of her life.
MELISSA BLOCK, host:
The federal investigation of last year's coal mine disaster in West Virginia took a new twist today. Investigators say they've discovered internal Massey Energy documents that show the company falsified safety records at its Upper Big Branch mine.
The Labor Department's chief lawyer says the matter has been referred to the Justice Department for possible criminal prosecution.
NPR's Howard Berkes is in Beckley, West Virginia, where investigators presented an of a year-long probe.
HOWARD BERKES: The Mine Safety and Health Administration showed examples of internal Massey Energy documents that noted serious safety problems at the Upper Big Branch mine. But those problems were left off official documents reviewed by federal mine safety inspectors.
Kevin Stricklin is the coal mine safety chief at the Mine Safety and Health Administration.
Mr. KEVIN STRICKLIN (Cole Mine Safety Chief, Mine Safety and Health Administration): It's not a problem for a mine operator if they want to keep more than one set of books. That's their prerogative. But what they have to do is record the hazards that are associated with any examination underground in the official record book. And we found that wasn't the case here.
BERKES: These are record books kept by foremen underground before and during each coal mining shift. The books note safety hazards and whether corrections were made. They alert miners to danger on later shifts, and they alert federal mine inspectors to safety problems.
Stricklin also says his investigators documented a pattern of intimidation at Upper Big Branch.
Mr. STRICKLIN: Upper management threatened to fire frontline supervisors for not meeting production goals. Safety hazards such as insufficient air were not acceptable excuses for not running coal. A section foreman was fired for delaying production for about an hour to fix ventilation problems. One of the victims was told if you can't go up there to run coal, just bring your bucket outside and go home.
BERKES: That victim of the Upper Big Branch explosion is Dean Jones, a veteran crew boss, who told his supervisors he needed to keep his men out of the mine when extremely weak airflow made explosive concentrations of methane gas possible.
His widow Gina Jones told me last night that Dean resisted the pressure to ignore safety.
Ms. GINA JONES: Because I told him to. I said they don't live your life. You know, they dont care about you. I said you've got family. I said worry about yourself and your men.
BERKES: Massey was absorbed by Alpha Natural Resources a month ago, and an Alpha spokesman says the company is still reviewing all the allegations against Massey.
Alpha boasts a much better attitude toward safety, but NPR has learned and Alpha confirms that two of the Massey managers directly responsible for Upper Big Branch continue to work for Alpha. Jason Whitehead and Chris Blanchard are not Alpha managers, the spokesman says. They're in technical support positions instead.
Clay Mullins is worried more about the mine safety agency itself. Mullins lost his brother Rex at Upper Big Branch.
Mr. CLAY MULLINS: It's MSHA's job and the state's job to enforce the law and make sure that Massey does their job. And all three of them failed at their job. If they had enforced the laws that they had then, we wouldnt be here sitting and talking because this accident would not have happened.
BERKES: Mine safety chief Kevin Stricklin says any possible agency failure is the subject of a separate Labor Department investigation. And that's ongoing.
Stricklin's probe reinforces preliminary conclusions about the cause of the explosion and provides stronger evidence that Massey's own theory is groundless. The company had argued it was a natural disaster and not caused by Massey's failures.
These waves of information were difficult last night for Bobbie Pauley, a coal miner herself, who lost her fiance, Boone Payne, when Upper Big Branch exploded.
Ms. BOBBIE PAULEY (Coal Miner): Because I kept thinking, you know, you've waited over a year. You wanted answers. Tonight you're going to get them. But then another side of me said I don't want to know because it brings it all back, you know, right in your face.
BERKES: And it'll be back again in the fall when the Federal Mine Safety Agency issues a final written report and again if the Justice Department issues indictments. But Bobbie Pauley says she cries every day anyway about losing the man she thought she'd be with the rest of her life.
Howard Berkes, NPR News, Beckley, West Virginia. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.