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by M. Hassan Kakar
University of California Press
Copyright © 1997 All rights reserved.
ISBN: 0-520-08591-4
Introduction
Landlocked Afghanistan links Central Asia with South Asia and,
to some extent, with West Asia or the Middle East. The latter is
also connected through Afghanistan to China. In this important crossroads
have lived from ancient times many ethnic groups, known in recent
times as Afghans. They speak about thirty languages and dialects
belonging to four main linguistic groups: Indo-Aryan, Turkic-Mongolian,
Semitic, and Dravidian. The Indo-Aryan languages Pashto and Dari
(Afghan Persian) serve as lingua francas, hence the significance
of their speakers, that is, Pashtuns and Tajiks. These two groups
constitute the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s inhabitants,
who numbered 15.5 million in 1979. Among these groups, in particular
the Pashtuns, bilingualism is high. The Pashtuns outnumber all the
other groups combined.
For centuries the Pashtuns have played the dominant role in politics.
Their main division, the Durrani, provided Afghanistan with the
ruling dynasties of Sadozay in the eighteenth century and Mohammadzay
from then until recently. The main Turkic group is the Uzbeks, who
speak the Uzbeki language. Just more numerous than the Uzbeks are
the Turko-Mongol Hazaras, who speak Dari and adhere to the Shi’ite
faith of Islam. Ethnic identity among the illiterate Afghans who
constitute the majority is strong. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and
Turkomen have kin in the neighboring lands of Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. They also share with them the religion
of Islam. Except for the small group of Afghan Hindus and Sikhs,
about 90 percent of Afghans are Sunnis and 10 percent Shi’as.
The ratio of ethnic groups is unknown because of the inroads of
the main languages in each other’s domains, particularly in
the mixed areas where Pashtuns and Tajiks have lived for thousands
of years and where intermarriage is common, as it is among the educated
Afghans. This and the universalist religion of Islam, the assimilation
of ethnic minorities within the dominant linguistic and ethnic communities,
and the economic interconnectedness of regions, which is the result
mainly of the introduction of a modern transportation network, have
softened the notion of ethnicity and contributed to the solidarity
of Afghans as a nation. The centuries-old dynastic rule and the
enforcement throughout the land of a unified set of laws by a central
government through a bureaucracy backed by a national standing army
have also worked in the same direction.
An ancient land, Afghanistan has a long and eventful history.
Its neighbors have influenced its history as it has theirs. Afghanistan
has, mainly in its outlying regions, people of common descent with
those of its neighboring countries. They were officially separated
from each other when Afghanistan’s boundaries were delimited
in the second part of the nineteenth century. The boundaries, particularly
that with Pakistan, are precarious. The latter was marked by the
so-called Durand Line, which separated Afghanistan from its own
Pashtuns, that is, the ethnic majority that had played a leading
role in creating Afghanistan in the eighteenth century. The boundaries
were then (and still are) so artificial that when people on either
side of the line were hard-pressed for any reason, they crossed
the line and settled across the border among their ethnic and coreligionist
brothers. Besides, about two million Pashtun nomads crossed the
Durand Line twice a year as a matter of course. The line was officially
observed, although the Afghans did not truly accept it, and their
successive governments, particularly after the British left India
in 1947, helped their Pashtun brothers on the other side of it to
constitute an independent land of their own, Pashtunistan. This
meant that the frontier problems, particularly the Pashtunistan
issue, deeply affected the political as well as diplomatic history
of Afghanistan. The frontier problem is thus an important element
of Afghan history.
Also important for Afghan history was the fact that two major
European colonial powers, Russia (later the Soviet Union), and Britain,
controlled her neighboring lands in the north and southeast. In
the nineteenth century both powers grabbed vast territories from
Afghanistan, reducing it to its present size; they then looked on
it as a buffer state. Britain was the more aggressive, warring with
Afghanistan three times (in 1838, 1878, and 1918), conducting foreign
relations for it (1880-1918), and imposing the aforementioned Durand
Line (1893). Seeing their country reduced in size and sandwiched
between two “infidel” giants, the Afghans became xenophobic,
inward-looking, and jealous of the independence of their country.
The delimitation of the boundaries of Afghanistan coincided with
the efforts of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901) to lay the foundation
of a strong central government, which marked the emergence of a
nation-state. A movement started by which the central government
concentrated power at the expense of a centuries-old traditional
system that assigned power and concessions to secular rural magnates
and religious groups. The consolidation of the nation-state, as
well as of his dynastic rule, made it necessary for Amir Abdur Rahman
Khan to build up a strong standing army aided by an expanded bureaucracy
and an extensive intelligence service, a stupendous task considering
the meager state income based mainly on an agricultural economy.
In this initial phase the state became absolute, monopolistic, protectionist,
and indifferent to modernization schemes in fields other than the
military. Suspicious of the outside world in the age of European
imperialism, Afghanistan remained distant from it. Although it always
had a sophisticated literary and political elite and a rich literature
in both national languages, Pashto and Dari, modern science and
education did not touch Afghanistan. Instead, it receded into the
world of conservative medievalism.[1]
The dawn of the new century coincided with the opening of Afghanistan
to the outside world, the introduction of modern education, and
the emergence of a small but assertive educated and bureaucratic
middle class that was nationalist and constitutionalist in outlook.
In the age of revolutions elsewhere, the prolific anti-imperialist
journalist Mahmud Tarzi led the way in the domain of thought and
propaganda. But after Afghanistan’s successful war of independence,
when the new reformist King Amanullah (1919-29) began to implement
the first radical comprehensive schemes of modernization, they proved
to be unrealistic and unpopular. They made him so unpopular that
finally in 1929 a social bandit, Habibullah, commonly known as Bacha-e-Saqqao,
overthrew him. With his downfall ended Afghanistan’s first
constitution, which Amanullah had promulgated in 1923, as well as
the dynastic rule established by his grandfather Amir Abdur Rahman
in 1880. As the new ethnic Tajik amir, Habibullah ruled for only
nine turbulent months. Mohammad Nadir, a former military general
of another Mohammadzay section of the Pashtun Durrani tribe, toppled
the new amir in October 1929 and established his own dynasty of
the Musahiban or Yahyakhel section.
The failure of the reforms and the rule of a Tajik amir for the
first time in modern Afghanistan had serious repercussions that
became manifest during the reign of King Nadir (1929-33). The Pashtun-Tajik
relationship became strained for a while, and the conservative elements,
represented by spiritual leaders and tribal elders, were granted
scores of concessions and high positions in the government. Scholars
and writers were organized in a new literary association, and religious
scholars in a new association of the ‘ulama. Modern education
was reintroduced, though on a smaller scale, and the foundation
for the future Kabul University laid down, but female education
was neglected. Government-controlled dailies and weeklies were established
in Kabul as well as provincial capitals. Some of the many supporters
of the reformist king and the smaller group of constitutionalists
were suppressed; others were imprisoned, and a few were even executed.
Although he established a family rule by granting high posts to
his four brothers and other relatives, King Nadir structured the
government on the basis of a new constitution. Instituted in 1931,
it provided for an elected National Consultative Assembly and an
appointed House of Elders. The monarchy was called constitutional.
But the new nation-building movement came to an abrupt halt in November
1933, when a student shot the king dead.
The sudden death of the top person of the new dynasty did not
create chaos, although a number of pro-Amanullah, constitutionalist,
and anti-British radical Afghans known as the “Young Afghans”
had carried out terroristic attacks against its members for some
time (one had killed the eldest brother of the late king). They
accused the new rulers of being under British influence. The situation
was brought under control when Shah Mahmud, the minister of defense
and a brother of the late king, arrested the assassin and declared
the nineteen-year-old Mohammad Zahir, the only son of the late king,
the new ruler. The notables followed him in paying homage to the
new king. No other change took place, and the late king’s three
brothers and nephews, led by Mohammad Hashim Khan as prime minister,
ruled the country uninterruptedly for thirteen years until 1946.
Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Khan worked tirelessly in maintaining
law and order. He did not tolerate opposition, although he allowed
provincial assemblies and the national parliament to function as
provided by the constitution. Their members, however, were handpicked.
He permitted King Mohammad Zahir, his nephew, to enjoy life, but
not to rule; by contrast, he trained his full nephews, Mohammad
Daoud and Mohammad Na’eem, in the art of government by giving
them responsible positions. The assassin and his nearest relations
were executed and scores of others imprisoned. With the help of
the intelligence service (zabt-e-ahwalat) backed by a strong army,
the government arrested many constitutionalists and other persons,
often for no apparent reason; they were detained in filthy prison
cells for years without trial. After the late king was assassinated,
the ruling circle had decided not to execute its opponents for fear
of revenge.
Modern education was developed, but only gradually. After the
fall of Amanullah people made no demand for it. The authorities
were also not enthusiastic about education, fearing that it might
produce radicals. Besides, the government had to restart education
from scratch, since the 322 primary and vocational schools, which
had a total of 54,000 students in 1927, had been closed after the
fall of Amanullah.[2] In 1945, after a quarter of a century of the
new dynasty, only 98,000 students studied in 346 primary and secondary
schools, and Kabul University had only four colleges. Besides, schools
were controlled lest they become the source of too liberal thought.
Meanwhile, the government opened courses for officials to learn
Pashto, the language of the majority; the policy was to make it,
along with Persian, an official language, thus speeding the process
of nation-building and consolidating ties with the transfrontier
Pashtuns.[3]
Notable progress was made in the national economy, which had been
destroyed during the rebellion. Masterminded by the businessman
Abdul Majid Zabuli, a banking system was introduced, and joint stock
companies for export and import were set up. By 1946 more than fifty
such companies operated.[4] The resulting accumulation of capital
made it possible for the National Bank and private companies to
set up a number of factories for textile, woolen, sugar, and fruit
processing. Cotton and sugar beets were grown in vast areas brought
under cultivation in Qunduz in the northern part of the country.
This region was connected to the southern part of the land for the
first time by a vehicle-passable road crossing the Hindu Kush, an
accomplishment that helped make these developments possible. Zabuli’s
success was partly due to his policy of making members of the dynasty,
in particular the prime minister, partners in business.
Unwilling to grant concessions to its immediate neighbors, the
government failed to obtain from distant governments and private
companies major credits or capital for investment, in spite of the
fact that it offered favorable concessions to the American Inland
Exploration Company for the exploration and exploitation of oil
and mineral deposits.[5] Deterrents were Afghanistan’s distant,
landlocked position, its difficult regions, its primitive transportation
system, and, above all, its closeness to the Soviet Union. Only
Nazi Germany, from 1937 onward, undertook to survey mineral deposits
and extend a large amount of credit for Afghanistan to purchase
German machinery. Germany sent a large number of specialists to
Afghanistan, but they, along with others from Japan and Italy working
on smaller projects, were expelled under pressure from the Allies
during World War II.[6] Advised by a loya jirga (grand assembly),
Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim followed a policy of “correct
neutrality” during the war. After the war, when conditions
both at home and abroad had changed, the king asked him to step
down; thus ended Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim’s long, suppressive
rule. A brief democratic interlude followed.
The new prime minister, Shah Mahmud, another uncle of the king,
was a mild person suitable to rule at a time when Afghanistan was
applying for membership to the United Nations. His first act was
to release the many political prisoners who had long languished
in prisons. Significant also was the passage in 1947 of a law allowing
the election of mayors by secret ballot. More significant, in 1949
the government refrained almost completely from interfering in parliamentary
elections. The result was a national assembly dominated by liberal
democrats who stood for constitutional monarchy. Progovernment conservatives
and others reacted against the democrats, and stormy sessions marked
the first freely elected assembly based on the constitution of 1931.
The political atmosphere became euphoric when, following the enactment
of a free press law, a number of nongovernmental weeklies—Angar,
Ulus, Watan, and Niday-e-Khalq—caught the imagination of the
emerging and receptive intelligentsia; among them were students
of Kabul University, who formed an active organization of their
own. The weeklies were significant more as a mouthpiece for the
new political parties—the Awakened Youth, the Fatherland, the
People, and the National Club—than for being a vehicle of propaganda
among a largely illiterate people. By means of the press, reformist
members of the assembly became so outspoken that the government
felt it could no longer govern democratically. On the eve of the
next general election, when former members of the assembly had no
parliamentary immunity, they and scores of other dissidents were
arrested. The rising group from the second generation of the dynasty
had concluded that a strong government was needed to deal with the
new situation. Led by the king and his two first cousins and brothers-in-law,
Mohammad Daoud and Mohammad Na’eem, this group decided to rule
with Mohammad Daoud as the new prime minister. Events in the newly
created Pakistan also influenced this decision.[7]
The creation of Pakistan following the British withdrawal from
the subcontinent of India in 1947 prompted Afghanistan to raise
the question of the principle of self-determination in regard to
Pashtunistan, now claimed by Pakistan. Afghanistan disputed Pakistan’s
claim over the territory, but the latter was unwilling to consider
the complaint, despite the fact that it demanded itself the application
of the same principle with regard to Kashmir, a territory disputed
between Pakistan and India. Against the unwavering stand of Afghanistan
over the issue, Pakistan retaliated by creating problems for the
former’s commercial goods in transit through her territory,
the main route to Afghanistan. Pakistan also bombarded an Afghan
village in 1949, an incident that injured Afghan pride beyond imagination.
The radio war between the two countries intensified, much to the
disadvantage of Pakistan. Afghan propagandists were on the offensive.
Mediation efforts by friendly countries came to nothing. To decrease
its dependence on Pakistan, the Afghan government concluded a number
of commercial agreements with the willing Soviet Union, a new beginning
in the atmosphere of cold war with a neighboring superpower with
far-reaching consequences. As an ardent nationalist, the new prime
minister was expected to resolve the Pashtunistan problem with Pakistan.[8]
Mohammad Daoud (1910-78) served as prime minister for ten years,
1953-63. During this decade Afghanistan experienced fundamental
changes that were initiated more under his direction than under
either his brother or the king. From the age of eighteen Daoud held
more military positions than civilian. Like Amanullah, Daoud was
a reformist, but he also stood for law and order. He introduced
changes through the state, not individual or corporate channels.
However, the state he relied on was not totalitarian but authoritarian.
He disliked the notion of a democratic state based on individual
freedom.
With the rise to power of Mohammad Daoud, the nongovernmental
press ceased publication, and political parties became inactive.
Elections for the national assembly were held, but they were manipulated.
Once again the intelligence service (masuniyat-e-milli) was expanded
as it had been under Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim. In 1957, when
first a cabinet minister along with his colleagues and later a number
of dissidents were arrested on flimsy charges, the sense of security
that had prevailed with the beginning of the democratic interlude
evaporated.
But progress in the economic field was visible. It started with
the launching of the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan in
1957, financed partly by a Soviet loan of $100 million; a second
plan was launched in 1962. Under the plans the main roads throughout
the country were paved, some hydroelectric dams built, irrigation
projects launched, education and health services improved or expanded,
and some industries developed. Agricultural and commercial development
banks were also set up. The expanding bureaucracy absorbed the increasing
number of educated elements, as the state traditionally had undertaken
to employ such people. But the overall development fell short of
the targets originally set under the system of a “guided, mixed
economy” because of the lack of statistical data, insufficient
capital, and a shortage of qualified personnel. In fact, the economic
development schemes were the almost total concern of the state,
not of private development banks or companies, whether foreign or
indigenous.[9] The foundation of the planned development was laid
down, and the state became more comprehensive than ever before.
Also, since the plans were financed mainly by foreign credit, the
country was opened to foreign influence. No longer was Afghanistan
the isolated land it had been traditionally.
In 1959 women were allowed to unveil. The unveiling proceeded
smoothly in Kabul because of the increase in the number of educated
women, who worked mainly as nurses, midwives, and teachers. The
desire to unveil had become a marked tendency, particularly among
the intelligentsia. Also, the government did not make a provocative
fanfare on the occasion as did Amanullah in the 1920s, nor was the
unveiling compulsory. When women members of the dynasty and spouses
of senior government officials appeared unveiled in public functions,
others followed suit. Only in the city of Kandahar did people rise
up, but the rebellion there was due to the stupidity of the governor,
whose tactless attitude regarding the unveiling provoked strong
reaction. The revolt, suppressed at a cost of about sixty lives,
remained local. The government was capable of dealing with such
emergencies, since it had already equipped the army with modern
weapons obtained from the Soviet Union.
On the Pashtunistan issue, by contrast, the government failed.
Premier Daoud had set as one of his principal tasks the settlement
of the Pashtunistan issue. In the beginning Pakistan’s leaders
showed interest in reaching a modus vivendi with Afghanistan over
Pashtunistan, since they had a similar problem with India over Kashmir.
However, because of unstable internal conditions Pakistan’s
leaders limited the traditional autonomy of its provinces, including
the hitherto autonomous region of Pashtunistan, and joined the two
regional military alliances, SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)
and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), which the United States
supported as an extension of the military arrangement to contain
the Soviet Union. The Pakistani authorities not only discarded the
Afghan claim over Pashtunistan (called the Northwest Frontier Province
in Pakistan) but also curtailed its traditional autonomy. Diplomatic
efforts of the two governments and mediation by friendly governments
could not move either side from its position. In 1958 the Pakistani
president Mohammad Ayyub, also a Pashtun, even threatened Afghanistan
when, “instead of listening to the Afghan views,” he “lectured
Na’eem [the Afghan foreign minister] about Pakistan’s
military might and its ability to take Kabul within a few hours.”[10]
In 1954 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, seeing Afghanistan
as a country of no “security interest” to America, not
only did not allow Afghanistan to purchase military hardware from
the United States but even advised the Afghan foreign minister to
settle the dispute with Pakistan, stating, “After careful consideration,
extending military aid to Afghanistan would create problems not
offset by the strength it would generate.”[11]
Premier Daoud was left no choice but to approach the Soviet Union
for economic as well as military aid. For its part the Soviet Union,
under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, was willing to extend
aid, hoping to keep Afghanistan outside the American-dominated military
blocs. Khrushchev also supported Afghanistan’s stand on Pashtunistan.
Afghanistan intensified its propaganda war against Pakistan, and
in 1961 it incited a major clash in Bajaur across the Durand Line.
In the battle between adherents of both countries, pro-Afghan tribesmen
were beaten and heavy casualties inflicted on them. Subsequently,
Pakistan asked the Afghan government to close its consulates in
that country, as it had closed its own consulates in Afghanistan.
The Afghan government retaliated by severing diplomatic ties with
Pakistan. For two years Afghanistan did not receive commercial goods
either from Pakistan or through it from Western countries, some
of whom had undertaken projects in Afghanistan. This isolation hit
the Afghans severely, in particular the business community and the
development programs. It increased Afghanistan’s dependence
on the Soviet Union, an ominous situation that the king and others
could not tolerate. Pressured by the monarch, Premier Daoud resigned
in 1963. But by then Afghanistan had become so much entangled with
the Soviet Union in economic, military, and educational fields that
it could not free itself unless there were an alternative and a
strong will to change the course the Soviet Union had exploited
to its advantage, although the government of Daoud had stood firm
in its course of “positive nonalignment.”
In the constitutional decade, 1963-73, the king was the central
figure, although this statement may appear contradictory. King Mohammad
Zahir decided that the time was ripe for Afghanistan to be ruled
democratically. He supported a constitutional monarchy based on
a constitution that provided for the autonomy of the three branches
of the state and that guaranteed the freedom of the individual.
Also, he arranged that members of the royal house (including the
king’s male first cousins) were to be barred from taking part
in politics. The election for the national assembly was to be free,
direct, general, and secret, while the senate was to be composed
of members chosen partly through direct election, partly through
indirect election, and partly through appointment. These were the
central points of the new constitution composed by a committee of
experts, passed by a loya jirga, and signed in 1964 by the king.[12]
Except for a few cases, the government did not interfere in the
elections, and the two elections that were held in 1965 and 1969
produced representative national assemblies. The majority of their
members were from the rural secular and religious elite, mainly
interested in pressuring the executive to further their own interests
and those of their own constituencies. Most had won their seats
by spending money. Members of the educated middle class had little
chance of success in the elections. Among the national and liberal
democrats, who were elected mainly from the urban constituencies,
a few were leftists, and four of the urban members were women. Thus,
contrary to the spirit of a liberal constitution, the assembly was
dominated by nonliberals and nondemocrats who did not know the workings
of the constitution. They often failed to form a quorum and frequently
fought the government, a situation that contributed to instability.
In contrast with the past, in the constitutional decade the governments—or,
more precisely, the executive branches—had short lives: an
average of two years for each of the five governments. They were
also weaker, with no basis of power of their own; they had only
the king to rely on. But the king, though supported by his younger
son-in-law and cousin, Abdul Wali, and others, now had opponents
in the persons of his other first cousins and brothers-in-law, Daoud
and Na’eem, who had turned against the new arrangement because
it excluded them from politics. Daoud skillfully joined hands with
a faction of the pro-Moscow communists in opposition to the government.
The king failed either to win him over to his side or to neutralize
him. In addition, the government had to meet challenges from the
national assemblies and unruly students incited by political parties.
Although the political parties were not legal, they were active
nonetheless. The government was also exposed to a free and critical
press that mushroomed overnight.
The king chose premiers from among those whose loyalty to him
was beyond question; however, they were not delegated the authority
to choose their cabinet colleagues. Also, they did not have control
over the army, nor could they stop members of the royal house from
interfering in government affairs. One such interference led to
the downfall in October 1965 of the first government, headed by
Premier Mohammad Yusuf, an ominous beginning. Not all the premiers
were qualified. Prime Minister Mohammad Zahir resigned because his
government was unable to deal with the emergency caused by a drought
in 1972; Premier Nur Ahmad E’temadi was given the post because
through him the king intended to mollify Mohammad Daoud. E’temadi
was pro-Daoud and also partly anticonstitution. He permitted a faction
of the pro-Moscow communists to proceed with their activities whereas
he oppressed others, particularly the religious groups. This situation
discouraged others from acting against a small but determined number
of pro-Moscow leftists who, with others, tried to undermine the
democratic arrangement.
The king’s failure to sign the Political Parties Bill, the
Municipalities Bill, and the Provincial Councils Bill, all passed
by the parliament, prevented national, provincial, and municipal
governments from taking root. The premiers relied on his goodwill.
The king had no privy council and consulted certain dignitaries
individually. Anarchy resulted from his failure to grant authority
to the government and the latter’s failure to establish a working
relationship with the national assembly as well as to deal with
the uncontrollable students and the problems that followed a drought
in 1972. (Students who were under the spell of mainly subversive
leftist parties spent more time in demonstrating than studying.)
Only then did the king empower Musa Shafiq, who took bold steps
in establishing the authority of the government. The new prime minister
accomplished in seven months what others had failed to do in years.
He was on the way to resolving the essential problems against which
the previous governments had struggled, but before he was able to
do so Mohammad Daoud, with the cooperation of pro-Moscow leftist
military officers, overthrew the constitutional monarchy and declared
Afghanistan a republic in July 1973.
The accomplishments of the constitutional decade were many. The
most important accomplishment was security from government interference
and the freedom to live within the bounds of law. This made it possible
for a number of political parties to emerge: the People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Islamic Association (IA), the People’s
New Democratic Party, the Voice of the People, the Social Democratic
Party, the National Unity, the Progressive Democratic Party, and
the National Oppression Party. From the turmoil of these parties,
which tended to split into factions, the radical pro-Moscow leftists
(the PDPA), and the radical Islamic fundamentalists (the IA) came
to the forefront. The IA and PDPA were supported more by their foreign
patrons than by their own Afghan constituencies. Parties with no
outside patrons and moderate programs did not play a major role:
hence the radicalization of Afghan politics and the intolerance
and violence in the decades ahead. Also, these events led to the
influence of foreign powers in Afghan politics, beginning with the
communist coup in 1978. I describe these and other parties in chapters
3, 4, and 5.
Also during the constitutional period, for the first time in Afghan
history the government ceased to be authoritarian and its agents
ceased to boss individuals. Prisoners of the previous regime were
released, and no one could be imprisoned before being tried as law
required. The government no longer spied on Afghans, who now enjoyed
freedom as never before. Afghanistan became a haven for the unrestricted
movement not only of Afghans but also of tourists, particularly
the hippies of the decade. The tourist industry developed overnight,
a result of the economic policy of the government, which encouraged
the private sector. In the industrial and agricultural fields Afghan
entrepreneurs showed dynamism. This became possible when, at the
beginning of the decade, the government restored diplomatic ties
with Pakistan and improved relations with Iran. The policy was to
support Pashtunistan on the basis of the principle of self-determination,
but without endangering Afghanistan’s interests. Premier Shafiq
took this point seriously and tried to develop Afghanistan’s
ties with Iran and Pakistan.[13]
Mohammad Daoud ruled Afghanistan as president under conditions
different from those that prevailed when he served as prime minister.
He now had to share power with members of the pro-Moscow communist
Parcham faction of the PDPA, whose military wing helped him to usurp
power. The suspension of the constitution and the coup created a
power vacuum that had to be filled if stability was to become real.
In the beginning the vacuum did not create problems, since the king,
who was vacationing at the time of the coup in Italy, abdicated
in Daoud’s favor. But the coup and his reliance on the communists
deprived Daoud of the service of the members of his former ruling
dynasty; it also estranged him from the liberals and democrats and
the fundamentalists of the Islamic Association. The free press and
the security of the constitutional decade vanished. A former premier
and leader of the Progressive Democratic Party was arrested, as
were his colleagues and some leading members of the Islamic Association;
some were executed. Hoping to make Afghanistan more dependent on
the Soviet Union, the communists pressured President Daoud to adopt
a policy of brinksmanship with Pakistan over the problem of Pashtunistan.
The first reaction was shown by the Islamic fundamentalists, who
arose in 1975. Though suppressed, the uprising disillusioned Daoud
about his comradeship with the communists and his policies in general.
He then began to change his internal and external policies. Having
consolidated his position, he expelled communists from the ministerial
posts. To make his regime legitimate, he summoned a loya jirga of
notables in 1977 and asked it to approve a constitution and elect
a president for the republic. The jirga passed the constitution
and elected him president for seven years, but the intrigues that
were played even by Daoud damaged his credibility. Besides, a one-party
system was introduced that was to be led by the official National
Revolutionary Party, a bunch of bureaucrats. This system made the
democratic rights granted by the constitution meaningless. Also,
the president gave key posts in the new cabinet to minions of doubtful
loyalty. Later a criminal code was enacted that banned political
activities and empowered security officials. Although not acted
on at the time, the code created fear, particularly among the communists
for whose suppression it had been enacted.
Fundamental changes were introduced in foreign relations. President
Daoud visited Arab countries and obtained loan commitments for his
seven-year development plan from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and
Libya. More important, the confrontational attitude with Pakistan
was abandoned, and after the exchange of visits to Islamabad and
Kabul by leaders of both countries, the ground was prepared for
the settlement of outstanding issues, including Pashtunistan. In
the words of an Afghan diplomat who had attended the meetings, “In
three to four years the Afghan-Pakistani dispute would have ceased
to exist.”[14]
The change in relations with the Soviet Union meant distancing
Afghanistan from it when “the Russians had become increasingly
disturbed by the emergence of new and expanded ties between Afghanistan
and its Islamic neighbors.” Until then Soviet-Afghan relations
had improved because of the grant by the Soviet Union of new economic
credit and the increase in trade between the two countries. But
President Daoud was now “increasingly annoyed” at the
Soviet “clandestine activities” and their efforts to unite
the two factions—the Khalq and the Parcham—of the pro-Moscow
PDPA. He intended to ask the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev “whether
Soviet subversive actions in Afghanistan had received his sanction
or were carried out without his knowledge.” But before Daoud
was able to do so, Brezhnev, in their last official meeting in the
Kremlin in April 1977, lectured him, asking why Afghanistan had
allowed experts from the United Nations, NATO countries, and other
multilateral aid projects into northern Afghanistan adjacent to
the Soviet Union. Further, he “wanted the Afghan government
to get rid of those experts, who were nothing more than spies bent
on promoting the cause of imperialism.” Daoud was surprised.
After a pause he lectured Brezhnev in return in these words; “We
will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and
whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ foreign experts
will remain the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan
shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its acts and decisions.”[15]
In 1977 a series of terroristic attacks by Islamic fundamentalists
and leftists disturbed the peace in Kabul. On 17 April 1978 Mier
Akbar Khybar, a prominent member of the PDPA, fell victim to such
an attack. The PDPA’s leaders held a funeral procession in
which some spoke against the government. Since the procession was
a demonstration of strength and in violation of the criminal code,
the government took action. On 25 April 1978 the police detained
seven members of the PDPA’s politburo as ordinary prisoners
in the mud-walled prison cells in the center of the city. The police
delayed arresting Hafizullah Amin, a military liaison officer of
the Khalq faction of PDPA, until the next day, when they searched
his house. This gave Amin time to draw up a plan of operation for
overthrowing the government, an order that was carried out on 27
and 28 April, while he was still in prison, by military officers
who were almost all Khalqis. Unwilling to submit, President Daoud
was killed, as were eighteen members of his family and a number
of his ministers.
Thus ended the dominance of the Durranis, who had ruled Afghanistan
since 1747. The persons now destined to govern had different ethnolinguistic
backgrounds. They were a cross-section of society, but as part of
the educated middle class, particularly as communists, they had
alienated themselves from their origins. None had lofty social standing.
Except for Nur Mohammad Taraki, general secretary of the PDPA, they
were more or less of the same age and thus unwilling to submit to
any of themselves as a ruler. The communist ideology had tied them
to the party, the medium of power, but this solidarity reflected
more their desire to acquire power than their desire to unite in
a common cause—hence their potential for divisiveness. The
potential exploded into hostile forces after they became a political
ruling class. Besides, most had no administrative experience, but
each was convinced that the PDPA blueprint was the guideline for
reorganizing both society and state. Thus, they relied on Soviet,
not Afghan, experience, and thus, too, they broke with the Afghan
past. This may explain why, after they rose to power, they became
ever more alienated from their own people and ever more disunited
among themselves. As of 1994, the political vacuum they created
remained unfilled.
Following the coup, the PDPA ruled Afghanistan with Nur Mohammad
Taraki as president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister,
and general secretary of the PDPA. Intolerant of opposition, the
government began to implement socialistic programs by issuing a
series of eight decrees, including the land reform decree, in an
authoritarian manner without regard for consensus and social conventions.
The government relied on the army, the police, the party, and, of
course, the support of the Soviet Union. The government’s socialistic
programs, its single-party dictatorship, and the excesses its officials
and party personnel committed resulted not in winning over the populace,
as it had hoped, but in popular uprisings, all of which the government
suppressed, just as it suppressed rival political parties of the
right and left. Even within the PDPA, the ruling Khalqi faction
suppressed the Parcham faction and sent its leaders abroad as ambassadors,
later dismissing them. Within the Khalq faction, too, rifts occurred,
and the strong Hafizullah Amin replaced Taraki as head of government
and the party. All this weakened the government and made it still
more dependent on the Soviet Union. After Amin tried to rule Afghanistan
the way Marshall Tito had ruled Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union intervened.
What follows in this book is based mainly on a journal of events,
written in Pashto and exceeding a thousand pages, that I kept frommid-1979
to my imprisonment in 1982. My prison life (1982-87) gave me an
unparalleled opportunity to interview many well-informed inmates,
including some Khalqi senior officials. Because I was known to be
a historian, many inmates trusted me with information, as did other
well-informed Afghans after my release from the prison. I have lived
through the period about which, as a student of Afghan history,
I was curious to know.
This work covers the period from 1979 until 1982. A chapter on
the events before the invasion has been added to describe the circumstances
under which the Soviet Union decided to invade. Although the period
is arbitrary, the richness of events, the abundance of data, and
my personal experience of it make it important enough to warrant
a separate study. The richness of the period is due to the determination
of the occupation forces to suppress the resistance quickly before
the occupation could become an issue and the outside world could
justify its assistance to it.
Despite the sheer quantity of interesting events, no historian
in any language has so far studied the period as a unit in detail.
Impressed by the Soviet determination to subdue the Afghans, the
English-speaking world paid only marginal attention to the resistance
forces of a geographically remote neighbor of the Soviet Union.
The Western world was under the impression that since the Soviets
had dominated their neighbor countries in Eastern Europe, they would
also dominate their neighbor country of Afghanistan. Afghan resistance
was held to be unviable. With that impression in mind, the Soviet
Union and the regime it installed tried to isolate the hitherto
nonaligned, independent, and Muslim Afghanistan from the outside
world. Under these circumstances there unfolded a story of conflict
between the fighting men of a Third World country, determined to
preserve their national and Islamic identity, and the fighting men
of a superpower that wished to bring them into the orbit of a communist
state. This work deals with this confrontation. It is a political
history that revolves around men, policies, and events. I describe
only those aspects of the government and society that the Kabul
regime tried to change. The work is, in short, an epitome of a political
and military dynamism—or a dynamic vandalism—in which
people are the central theme.
The account is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with why
and how the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The intervention unleashed
powerful forces of resistance to the invaders and the client government;
this resistance and the reaction of the Kabul regime are the subject
of parts 2 and 3. Part 4 concerns a more intensified degree of this
confrontation, an account of genocide that the occupation forces
committed in an attempt to uproot the resistance.
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