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by Robert Kaplan
Random House
Copyright
© 2000 All rights reserved.
ISBN: 0-375-50354-4
Excerpt
THE COMING ANARCHY
(February 1994)
THE MINISTER'S EYES were like egg yolks, an after-effect
of some of the many illnesses, malaria especially, endemic in his
country. There was also an irrefutable sadness in his eyes. He spoke
in a slow and creaking voice, the voice of hope about to expire.
Flame trees, coconut palms, and a ballpoint-blue Atlantic composed
the background. None of it seemed beautiful, though. "In forty-five
years I have never seen things so bad. We did not manage ourselves
well after the British departed. But what we have now is something
worse—the revenge of the poor, of the social failures, of the
people least able to bring up children in a modem society." Then
he referred to the recent coup in the West African country Sierra
Leone. "The boys who took power in Sierra Leone come from houses
like this." The Minister jabbed his finger at a corrugated metal
shack teeming with children. "In three months these boys confiscated
all the official Mercedes, Volvos, and BMWs and willfully wrecked
them on the road." The Minister mentioned one of the coup's leaders,
Solomon Anthony Joseph Musa, who shot the people who had paid for
his schooling, "in order to erase the humiliation and mitigate the
power his middle-class sponsors held over him."
Tyranny is nothing new in Sierra Leone or in the
rest of West Africa. But it is now part and parcel of an increasing
lawlessness that is far more significant than any coup, rebel incursion,
or episodic experiment in democracy. Crime was what my friend-a
top-ranking African official whose life would be threatened were
I to identify him more precisely-really wanted to talk about. Crime
is what makes West Africa a natural point of departure for my report
on what the political character of our planet is likely to be in
the twenty-first century.
The cities of West Africa at night are some of
the unsafest places in the world. Streets are unlit, the police
often lack gasoline for their vehicles; armed burglars, carjackers,
and muggers proliferate. "The government in Sierra Leone has no
writ after dark," says a foreign resident, shrugging. When I was
in the capital, Freetown, last September, eight men armed with AK-47s
broke into the house of an American man. They tied him up and stole
everything of value. Forget Miami: direct flights between the United
States and the Murtala Muharnmed Airport, in neighboring Nigeria's
largest city, Lagos, have been suspended by order of the U.S. Secretary
of Transportation because of ineffective security at the terminal
and its environs. A State Department report cited the airport for
"extortion by law enforcement and immigration officials." This is
one of the few times that the U.S. government has embargoed a foreign
airport for reasons that are linked purely to crime. In Abidjan,
effectively the capital of the Cote d'Ivoire, or Ivory Coast, restaurants
have stick- and gun-wielding guards who walk you the fifteen feet
or so between your car and the entrance, giving you an eerie taste
of what American cities might be like in the future. An Italian
ambassador was killed by gunfire when robbers invaded an Abidjan
restaurant. The family of the Nigerian ambassador was tied up and
robbed at gunpoint in the ambassador's residence. After university
students in the Ivory Coast caught bandits who had been plaguing
their dorms, they executed them by hanging tires around their necks
and setting the tires on fire. In one instance Ivorian policemen
stood by and watched the "necklacings," afraid to intervene. Each
time I went to the Abidjan bus terminal, groups of young men with
restless, scanning eyes surrounded my taxi, putting their hands
all over the windows, demanding "tips" for carrying my luggage even
though I had only a rucksack. In cities in six West African countries
I saw similar young men everywhere—hordes of them. They were
like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that
was clearly on the verge of igniting.
"You see," my friend the Minister told me, "in
the villages of Africa it is perfectly natural to feed at any table
and lodge in any hut. But in the cities this communal existence
no longer holds. You must pay for lodging and be invited for food.
When young men find out that their relations cannot put them up,
they become lost. They join other migrants and slip gradually into
the criminal process.
"In the poor quarters of Arab North Africa," he
continued, "there is much less crime, because Islam provides a social
anchor: of education and indoctrination. Here in West Africa we
have a lot of superficial Islam and superficial Christianity. Western
religion is undermined by animist beliefs not suitable to a moral
society, because they are based on irrational spirit power. Here
spirits are used to wreak vengeance by one person against another,
or one group against another." Many of the atrocities in the Liberian
civil war have been tied to belief in juju spirits, and the BBC
has reported, in its magazine Focus on Africa, that in the civil
fighting in adjacent Sierra Leone, rebels were said to have "a young
woman with them who would go to the front naked, always walking
backwards and looking in a mirror to see where she was going. This
made her invisible, so that she could cross to the army's positions
and there bury charms ... to improve the rebels' chances of success."
Finally my friend the Minister mentioned polygamy.
Designed for a pastoral way of life, polygamy continues to thrive
in sub-Saharan Africa even though it is increasingly uncommon in
Arab North Africa. Most youths I met on the road in West Africa
told me that they were from "extended" families, with a mother in
one place and a father in another. Translated to an urban environment,
loose family structures are largely responsible for the world's
highest birth rates and the explosion of the HIV virus on the continent.
Like the communalism and animism, they provide a weak shield against
the corrosive social effects of life in cities. In those cities
African culture is being redefined while desertification and deforestation-also
tied to overpopulation-drive more and more African peasants out
of the countryside.
A PREMONITION OF THE FUTURE WEST AFRICA IS BECOMING
the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal
stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic"
danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources,
refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and
international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security
firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated
through a West African prism. West Africa provides an appropriate
introduction to the issues, often extremely unpleasant to discuss,
that will soon confront our civilization. To remap the political
earth the way it will be a few decades hence-as I intend to do in
this article-I find I must begin with West Africa.
There is no other place on the planet where political
maps are so deceptive-where, in fact, they tell such lies-as in
West Africa. Start with Sierra Leone. According to the map, it is
a nation-state of defined borders, with a government in control
of its territory. In truth the Sierra Leonian government, run by
a twenty-seven-year-old army captain, Yalentine Strasser, controls
Freetown by day and by day also controls part of the rural interior.
In the government's territory the national army is an unruly rabble
threatening drivers and passengers at most checkpoints. In the other
part of the country units of two separate armies from the war in
Liberia have taken up residence, as has an army of Sierra Leonian
rebels. The government force fighting the rebels is full of renegade
commanders who have aligned themselves with disaffected village
chiefs. A premodern formlessness governs the battlefield, evoking
the wars in medieval Europe prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia,
which ushered in the era of organized nation-states.
As a consequence, roughly 400,000 Sierra Leonians
are internally displaced, 280,000 more have fled to neighboring
Guinea, and another 100,000 have fled to Liberia, even as 400,000
Liberians have fled to Sierra Leone. The third largest city in Sierra
Leone, Gondama, is a displaced-persons camp. With an additional
600,000 Liberians in Guinea and 250,000 in the Ivory Coast, the
borders dividing these four countries have become largely meaningless.
Even in quiet zones none of the governments except the Ivory Coast's
maintains the schools, bridges, roads, and police forces in a manner
necessary for functional sovereignty. The Koranko ethnic group in
northeastern Sierra Leone does all its trading in Guinea. Sierra
Leonian diamonds are more likely to be sold in Liberia than in Freetown.
In the eastern provinces of Sierra Leone you can buy Liberian beer
but not the local brand.
In Sierra Leone, as in Guinea, as in the Ivory
Coast, as in Ghana, most of the primary rain forest and the secondary
bush is being destroyed at an alarming rate. I saw convoys of trucks
bearing majestic hardwood trunks to coastal ports. When Sierra Leone
achieved its independence, in 1961, as much as 60 percent of the
country was primary rain forest. Now 6 percent is. In the Ivory
Coast the proportion has fallen from 38 percent to 8 percent. The
deforestation has led to soil erosion, which has led to more flooding
and more mosquitoes. Virtually everyone in the West African interior
has some form of malaria.
Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring,
albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa
and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central
governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked
spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war. West Africa
is reverting to the Africa of the Victorian atlas. It consists now
of a series of coastal trading posts, such as Freetown and Conakry,
and an interior that, owing to violence, volatility, and disease,
is again becoming, as Graham Greene once observed, "blank" and "unexplored."
However, whereas Greene's vision implies a certain romance, as in
the somnolent and charmingly seedy Freetown of his celebrated novel
The Heart of the Matter, it is Thomas Malthus, the philosopher of
demographic doomsday, who is now the prophet of West Africa's future.
And West Africa's future, eventually, will also be that of most
of the rest of the world.
CONSIDER "CHICAGO." I refer not to Chicago, Illinois,
but to a slum district of Abidjan, which the young toughs in the
area have named after the American city. ("Washington" is another
poor section of Abidjan.) Although Sierra Leone is widely regarded
as beyond salvage, the Ivory Coast has been considered an African
success story, and Abidjan has been called "the Paris of West Africa."
Success, however, was built on two artificial factors: the high
price of cocoa, of which the Ivory Coast is the world's leading
producer, and the talents of a French expatriate community; whose
members have helped ran the government and the private sector. The
expanding cocoa economy made the Ivory Coast a magnet for migrant
workers from all over West Africa: between a third and a half of
the country's population is now non-Ivorian, and the figure could
be as high as 75 percent in Abidjan. During the 1980s cocoa prices
fell and the French began to leave. The skyscrapers of the Paris
of West Africa are a facade. Perhaps 15 percent of Abidjan's population
of three million people live in shantytowns like Chicago and Washington,
and the vast majority live in places that are not much better. Not
all of these places appear on any of the readily available maps.
This is another indication of how political maps are the products
of tired conventional wisdom and, in the Ivory Coast's case, of
an elite that will ultimately be forced to relinquish power.
Chicago, like more and more of Abidjan, is a slum
in the bush: a checkerwork of corrugated zinc roofs and walls made
of cardboard and black plastic wrap. It is located in a gully teeming
with coconut palms and oil palms, and is ravaged by flooding. Few
residents have easy access to electricity, a sewage system, or a
dean water supply. The crumbly red laterite earth crawls with foot-long
lizards both inside and outside the shacks. Children defecate in
a stream filled with garbage and pigs, droning with malarial mosquitoes.
In this stream women do the washing. Young unemployed men spend
their time drinking beer, palm wine, and gin while gambling on pinball
games constructed out of rotting wood and rusty nails. These are
the same youths who rob houses in more prosperous Ivorian neighborhoods
at night. One man I met, Damba Tesele, came to Chicago from Burkina
Faso in 1963. A cook by profession, he has four wives and thirty-two
children, not one of whom has made it to high school. He has seen
his shanty community destroyed by municipal authorities seven times
since coming to the area. Each time he and his neighbors rebuild.
Chicago is the latest incarnation.
Fifty-five percent of the Ivory Coast's population
is urban, and the proportion is expected to reach 62 percent by
2000. The yearly net population growth is 3.6 percent. This means
that the Ivory Coast's 13.5 million people will become 39 million
by 2025, when much of the population will consist of urbanized peasants
like those of Chicago. But don't count on the Ivory Coast's still
e3dsting then. Chicago, which is more indicative of Africa's and
the Third World's demographic present-and even more of the future-than
any idyllic junglescape of women balancing earthen- jugs on their
heads, illustrates why the Ivory Coast, once a model of Third World
success, is becoming a case study in Third World catastrophe.
President Fe1ix Houphouet-Boigny, who died last
December at the age of about ninety, left behind a weak duster of
political parties and a leaden bureaucracy that discourages foreign
investment. Because the military is small and the non-1vorian population
large, there is neither an obvious force to maintain order nor a
sense of nationhood that would lessen the need for such enforcement.
The economy has been shrinking since the mid-1980s. Though the French
are working assiduously to preserve stability, the Ivory Coast faces
a possibility worse than a coup: an anarchic implosion of criminal
violence-an urbanized version of what has already happened in Somalia.
Or it may become an African Yugoslavia, but one without ministates
to replace the whole.
Because the demographic reality of West Africa
is a countryside draining into dense slums by the coast, ultimately
the region's rulers will come to reflect the values of these shantytowns.
There are signs of this already in Sierra Leone-and in Togo, where
the dictator Etienne Eyadema, in power since 1967, was nearly toppled
in 1991, not by democrats but by thousands of youths whom the London-based
magazine West Africa described as "Soweto-like stone-throwing adolescents."
Their behavior may herald a regime more brutal than Eyadema's repressive
one.
The fragility of these West African "countries"
impressed itself on me when I took a series of bush taxis along
the Gulf of Guinea, from the Togolese capital of Lom6, across Ghana,
to Abidjan. The four-hundred-mile journey required two full days
of driving, because of stops at two border crossings and an additional
eleven customs stations, at each of which my fellow passengers had
their bags searched. I had to change money twice and repeatedly
fill in currency-declaration forms. I had to bribe a Togolese immigration
official with the equivalent of eighteen dollars before he would
agree to put an exit stamp on my passport. Nevertheless, smuggling
across these borders is rampant. The London Observer has reported
that in 1992 the equivalent of $856 million left West Africa for
Europe in the form of "hot cash" assumed to be laundered drug money.
International cartels have discovered the utility of weak, financially
strapped West African regimes.
The more fictitious the actual sovereignty, the
more severe border authorities seem to be in trying to prove otherwise.
Getting visas for these states can be as hard as crossing their
borders. The Washington embassies of Sierra Leone and Guinea the
two poorest nations on earth, according to a 1993 United Nations
report on "human development"-asked for letters from my bank (in
lieu of prepaid round-trip tickets) and also personal references,
in order to prove that I had sufficient means to sustain myself
during my visits. I was reminded of my visa and currency hassles
while traveling to the communist states of Eastern Europe, particularly
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, before those states collapsed.
Ali A. Mazrui, the director of the Institute of
Global Cultural Studies at the State University of New York at Binghamton,
predicts that West Africa-indeed, the whole continent-is on the
verge of large-scale border upheaval. Mazrui writes,
In the 21st century France will be withdrawing
from West Africa as she gets increasingly involved in the affairs
[of Europe). France's West African sphere of influence will be filled
by Nigeria-a more natural hegemonic power... It will be under those
circumstances that Nigeria's own boundaries are likely to expand
to incorporate the Republic of Niger (the Hausa link), the Republic
of Benin (the Yoruba link) and conceivably Cameroon.
THE FUTURE COULD be more tumultuous, and bloodier,
than Mazrui dares to say. France will withdraw from former colonies
like Benin, Togo, Niger, and the Ivory Coast, where it has been
propping up local currencies. It will do so not only because its
attention will be diverted to new challenges in Europe and Russia
but also because younger French officials lack the older generation's
emotional ties to the ex-colonies. However, even as Nigeria attempts
to expand, it, too, is likely to split into several pieces. The
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research recently
made the following points in an analysis of Nigeria:
Prospects for a transition to civilian rule and
democratization are slim.... The repressive apparatus of the state
security service ... will be difficult for any future civilian government
to control.... The country is becoming increasingly ungovernable....
Ethnic and regional splits are deepening, a situation made worse
by an increase in the number of states from 19 to 30 and a doubling
in the number of local governing authorities; religious cleavages
are more serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian
militancy are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over southern
[Christian] control of the economy is intense ... the will to keep
Nigeria together is now very weak.
Given that oil-rich Nigeria is a bellwether for
the region—its population of roughly ninety million equals
the populations of all the other West African states combined-it
is apparent that Africa faces cataclysms that could make the Ethiopian
and Somalian famines pale in comparison. This is especially so because
Nigeria's population, including that of its largest city, Lagos,
whose crime, pollution, and overcrowding make it the dich6 par excellence
of Third World urban dysfunction, is set to double during the next
twenty-five years, while the country continues to deplete its natural
resources.
Part of West Africa's quandary is that although
its population belts are horizontal, with habitation densities increasing
as one travels south away from the Sahara and toward the tropical
abundance of the Atlantic littoral, the borders erected by European
colonialists are vertical, and therefore at cross-purposes with
demography and topography. Satellite photos depict the same reality
I experienced in the bush taxi: the Lome-Abidjan coastal corridor-indeed,
the entire stretch of coast from Abidjan eastward to Lagos-is one
burgeoning megalopolis that by any rational economic and geographical
standard should constitute a single sovereignty, rather than the
five (the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria) into which
it is currently divided.
As many internal African borders begin to crumble,
a more impenetrable boundary is being erected that threatens to
isolate the continent as a whole: the wall of disease. Merely to
visit West Africa in some degree of safety, I spent about five hundred
dollars for a hepatitis B vaccination series and other disease prophylaxis.
Africa may today be more dangerous in this regard than it was in
1862, before antibiotics, when the explorer Sir Richard Francis
Burton described the health situation on the continent as "deadly,
a Golgotha, a Jehannum." Of the approximately twelve million people
worldwide whose blood is HIV-positive, eight million are in Africa.
In the capital of the Ivory Coast, whose modem road system only
helps to spread the disease, 10 percent of the population is HIV-positive.
And war and refugee movements help the virus break through to more-remote
areas of Africa. Alan Greenberg, M.D., a representative of the Centers
for Disease Control in Abidjan, explains that in Africa the HIV
virus and tuberculosis are now "fast-forwarding each other." Of
the approximately four thousand newly diagnosed tuberculosis patients
in Abidjan, 45 percent were also found to be HIV-positive. As African
birth rates soar and slums proliferate, some experts worry that
viral mutations and hybridizations might, just conceivably, result
in a form of the AIDS virus that is easier to catch than the present
strain.
It is malaria that is most responsible for the
disease wall that threatens to separate Africa and other parts of
the Third World from more-developed regions of the planet in the
twenty-first century. Carried by mosquitoes, malaria, unlike AIDS,
is easy to catch. Most people in sub-Saharan Africa have recurring
bouts of the disease throughout their entire lives, and it is mutating
into increasingly deadly forms. "The great gift of Malaria is utter
apathy," wrote Sir Richard Burton, accurately portraying the situation
in much of the Third World today. Visitors to malaria-afflicted
parts of the planet are protected by a new drug, mefloquine, a side
effect of which is vivid, even violent, dreams. But a strain of
cerebral malaria resistant to mefloquine is now on the offensive.
Consequently, defending oneself against malaria in Africa is becoming
more and more like defending oneself against violent crime. You
engage in "behavior modification": not going out at dusk, wearing
mosquito repellent all the time.
And the cities keep growing. I got a general sense
of the future while driving from the airport to downtown Conakry,
the capital of Guinea. The forty-five-minute journey in heavy traffic
was through one never-ending shanty-town: a nightmarish Dickensian
spectacle to which Dickens himself would never have given credence.
The corrugated metal shacks and scabrous walls were coated with
black slime. Stores were built out of rusted shipping containers,
junked cars, and jumbles of wire mesh. The streets were one long
puddle of floating garbage. Mosquitoes and flies were everywhere.
Children, many of whom had protruding bellies, seemed as numerous
as ants. When the tide went out, dead rats and the skeletons of
cars were exposed on the mucky beach. In twenty-eight years Guinea's
population will double if growth goes on at current
rates. Hardwood logging continues at a madcap speed,
and people flee the Guinean countryside for Conakry. It seemed to
me that here, as elsewhere in Africa and the Third World, man is
challenging nature far beyond its limits, and nature is now beginning
to take its revenge.
AFRICA MAY BE as relevant to the future character
of world politics as the Balkans were a hundred years ago, prior
to the two Balkan wars and the First World War. Then the threat
was the collapse of empires and the birth of nations based solely
on tribe. Now the threat is more elemental: nature unchecked. Africa's
immediate future could be very bad. The coming upheaval, in which
foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with
the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden
coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering.
(Nine of twenty-one U.S. foreign-aid missions to be closed over
the next three years are in Africa-a prologue to a consolidation
of U.S. embassies themselves.) Precisely because much of Africa
is set to go over the edge at a time when the Cold War has ended,
when environmental and demographic stress in other parts of the
globe is becoming critical, and when the post-First World War system
of nation-states-not just in the Balkans but perhaps also in the
Middle East-is about to be toppled, Africa suggests what war, borders,
and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence.
To understand the events of the next fifty years,
then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial
dash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war. The order
in which I have named these is not accidental. Each concept except
the first relies partly on the one or ones before it, meaning that
the last two-new approaches to mapmaking and to warfare-are the
most important. They are also the least understood. I will now look
at each idea, drawing upon the work of specialists and also my own
travel experiences in various parts of the globe besides Africa,
in order to fill in the blanks of a new political atlas.
THE ENVIRONMENT AS A HOSTILE POWER
FO R A WH I LE the media will continue to ascribe
riots and other violent upheavals abroad mainly to ethnic and religious
conflict. But as these conflicts multiply, it will become apparent
that something else is afoot, making more and more places like Nigeria,
India, and Brazil ungovernable.
Mention "the environment" or "diminishing natural
resources" in foreign-policy circles and you meet a brick wall of
skepticism or boredom. To conservatives especially, the very terms
seem flaky. Public-policy foundations have contributed to the lack
of interest, by funding narrowly focused environmental studies replete
with technical jargon which foreign-affairs experts just let pile
up on their desks.
It is time to understand "the environment" for
what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first
century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations,
spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion,
air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded
regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh-developments that will
prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts-will
be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will
ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests
left over from the Cold War. In the twenty-first century water will
be in dangerously short supply in such diverse locales as Saudi
Arabia, Central Asia, and the southwestern United States. A war
could erupt between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile River water. Even
in Europe tensions have arisen between Hungary and Slovakia over
the damming of the Danube, a classic case of how environmental disputes
fuse with ethnic and historical ones. The political scientist and
erstwhile Clinton adviser Michael Mandelbaum has said, "We have
a foreign policy today in the shape of a doughnut-lots of peripheral
interests but nothing at the center." The environment, I will argue,
is part of a terrifying array of problems that will define a new
threat to our security, filling the hole in Mandelbaum's doughnut
and allowing a post-Cold War foreign policy to emerge inexorably
by need rather than by design.
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