Russia's Election Meddling Part Of A Long History Of 'Active Measures'

Updated at 12:50 p.m. ET

In 1983, an explosive story appeared in an Indian newspaper, The Patriot: the AIDS virus was the result of American biological weapons research.

Two years later a Soviet newspaper picked up the thread: The U.S. Army had developed AIDS as a bioweapon at Fort Detrick, Md. Other publications followed suit and by 1986, an East German biology professor was publishing "research" in which he explained that the virus had been tested on service members used as human guinea pigs — who then began spreading it among vulnerable populations.

None of it was true. All of it was fiction created by Russian intelligence officers or their allies.

But the storyline — that the U.S. government created AIDS — has proven one of the most durable examples of "dezinformatsiya," as it was known to its practitioners in the Soviet intelligence world.

Both that story (Kanye West believed it) and those practices endure today in the world's information bloodstream, and former CIA Director John Brennan appeared Tuesday on Capitol Hill to talk about "active measures" with the House Intelligence Committee.

Members of Congress want to focus on the ones the Russians used last year during the presidential campaign, but the deliberate crafting of falsehoods for political aims is just one of the tools in this kit, and leaders in Washington say the challenge they pose is just as urgent now as it has ever been.

"In essence, these active measures are an ongoing threat — not simply something that happened in the past," Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., said at a May 11 Senate Intelligence Committee hearing.

The heads of America's spy agencies agreed.

"The use of cyber and social media has significantly increased the impact and the capabilities that — obviously this has been done for years and years, even decades," said Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats. "But the ability they have to use the interconnectedness [of the Internet] and all that provides ... they literally upped their game to the point where it's having a significant impact."

And the interest by Russian intelligence in influencing public opinion in the United States goes beyond the political sphere, members of Congress warned. The U.S. intelligence community concluded Moscow intervened in last year's presidential race to hurt Hillary Clinton and help President Trump, but Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., said the Russians have — and have had — other targets.

Cotton cited past Russian efforts to undermine U.S. nuclear modernization, missile defense deployments and enforcement of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty — which American defense officials say Russian forces have violated with the deployment of a new missile in Eastern Europe.

"These [are] activities that will go far beyond elections, I think," Cotton said.

The cold-hearted king

Forgery, lies and skulduggery are as old as statecraft, wrote Robert Wallace, H. Keith Melton and Henry Robert Schlesinger in their CIA history, Spycraft. The authors cite a fake letter created in 1777 by Ben Franklin that appeared to be from a German king to England's King George III.

In the letter, King Frederick of Hesse — who was paid a bonus each time one of his mercenaries died in fighting the British war against the American colonies — "suggested" to King George that they be used more aggressively and denied medical treatment. In short, the German king appeared to want more of his men killed so the British king would pay him more.

That "letter" was "leaked" and the callous impression it created, along with other enticements by the American side, induced thousands of Hessians to quit the war, wrote Wallace, Melton and Schlesinger.

Such tricks continued down the years, with varying degrees of sophistication. In some examples they go beyond the simple release of information. In 1969, Sudanese goatherds found a cache of "American" spy equipment: a magnetic Limpet mine, a .22 caliber gun shaped like a pen and "State Department" documents revealing a plot against the government.

The materials appeared after the government in Khartoum broke off relations with the U.S. over its support for Israel and just as leaders there began to lean toward closer ties with the Soviet Union. As Wallace, Melton and Schlesinger describe, they were placed by the KGB to give the Sudanese a nudge — though CIA officer David Crown ultimately defeated that scheme.