The stakes of the U.S. election for the world

With Russia’s war against Ukraine, the wider war in the Middle East, the border issues with Mexico — the world is watching the U.S. presidential election more than ever.

We hear from international observers in Europe in Latin America to Africa about why how you vote matters to the rest of the world.

Today, On Point: The stakes of the U.S. election for the world.

Michal Baranowski, managing director of the East division of The German Marshall Fund, a nonpartisan transatlantic think tank.

Denise Dresser, Mexican political analyst and columnist. She is a professor of political science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), where she has taught comparative politics, political economy, and Mexican politics since 1991.

Larry Madowo, international correspondent at CNN. Host of the CNN series African Voices Changemakers.

Part I

MEGHNA CHAKRABARTI: When Americans cast their ballots on November 6th in the U.S. presidential election, their votes will not just influence the lives of all of their fellow Americans. The next president of the United States will also have a global impact. That's because the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election will have repercussions on what happens in the war in Ukraine, in the Middle East, in Gaza, in Lebanon.

It will impact international trade and tariffs. It'll shape border policy and immigration policy. It will even have an impact on global democracy. So this hour, we will be looking at three regions of the world, Europe, Latin America, and Africa, to hear about why how you vote matters to the rest of the world.

And we will start in Europe. Michal Baranowski is the Managing Director of the East Program of the German Marshall Fund and our nonpartisan transatlantic think tank, and he joins us from Warsaw, Poland. Michal, welcome to On Point.

MICHAL BARANOWSKI: It's great to be with you.

CHAKRABARTI: So just about every U.S. presidential election is of keen interest to the world.

But how consequential would you say this 2024 election is for Europeans?

BARANOWSKI: You're right that every U.S. election is important, but this feels like it's perhaps the most important U.S. election for Europe, for transatlantic relations in perhaps as long as a generation. Has to do both with the stark contrast between the two candidates, but perhaps even more importantly, the election comes in a very tumultuous time in our history, both in Europe, with the Russian war in Ukraine, but also with the broader instability in the Middle East. So right on the borders of Europe, we have two ongoing wars, and U.S. is a key ally of Europe and a key player when it comes to European security, when it comes to European prosperity, but also to the future of European democracy.

CHAKRABARTI: So it's one thing to hear an analyst say this could be the most consequential election for Europe in a generation.

But how would you measure the truth of that in terms of what average Europeans think or are seeing and hearing about the U.S. election.

BARANOWSKI: What I notice here in Poland, but also when I travel throughout Europe to Berlin, Paris, London, Brussels, is that really everyone I talk with, and grant you, I do talk with people from the analytical bubble, but perhaps even more broadly, a driver in a taxi or a friend just on the street, everyone asks about what will happen in U.S. presidential election.

Everyone seems to be following it very carefully. In my view, in my observation, many of the Europeans follow the U.S. politics more closely than they follow their domestic politics at the moment because what happens in the U.S. matters so much for us here in Europe.

CHAKRABARTI: So then, take me through the first couple of reasons why that is.

And obviously, first of all, is the long-standing U.S.-European alliance. Let's focus on NATO for a moment. As you mentioned, very clearly, the two nominees have different viewpoints of the NATO alliance, right? Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized NATO, he's aligned his speaking with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Vice President Kamala Harris thus far has said that she will hold the line on America's active participation in NATO, just as obviously for background for everybody. So tell me more about how Europeans view that difference, because it is a stark one, as you said.

BARANOWSKI: Absolutely. NATO is what keeps us safe. And by us, both us Europeans and us Atlanticists. So you, in that sense, Americans as well.

And that alliance has been strong over the last 75 years. We just celebrated it in with a summit in Washington this summer. Importantly, it has gotten stronger, especially in the last few years, with Europeans spending more on defense and the whole alliance beefing up its capabilities, because the situation on our borders has gotten so much more dangerous.

It is not just a matter of words. It's really a matter of survival, whether NATO works well, and whether NATO is able to deter, especially in this case, Russia, that is fighting an aggressive war just on our borders. I'm speaking to you from Warsaw, which is under 200 kilometers from borders with Russia and Belarus.

It's 600, 700 kilometers from the active front in Ukraine. So the stakes are very high. And when we look to the two candidates, we see Vice President Kamala Harris, who talks very openly about support for NATO, for the role it has played for U.S. interests. And that is very much an expectation of continuation of this course.

When we Europeans listen to President Trump or former President Trump, or his vice president. This is where there are lots of concerns, mostly with the rhetoric, because we also do remember, and especially many of the countries here on the eastern flank, that in fact, last time, President Trump, as a president of the United States, did not weaken NATO. In fact, but he did beat it up rhetorically.

But now the stakes are even higher with the war on our shores. We really cannot afford anyone to put any doubt or a question mark over whether U.S. And NATO as a whole would come to defense of our allies. And that's something that former President Trump did say very publicly.

CHAKRABARTI: Point well taken on that.

In addition though, a lot of what former President Trump talked about, again, rhetorically, as you said, during his first presidency, was he made it sound like NATO member nations were supposed to pay the United States for transatlantic defense. That's not true, right? The truth is that NATO member nations are expected to pay 2% of their budgets for defense spending, for their own defense spending.

But to Donald Trump's point, then, not all member nations actually met that spending commitment for quite some time. And in fact, it was only recently in 2024, and I would say because of what's happening in Ukraine, that the number of NATO member nations meeting that 2% rose dramatically.

And I'm seeing here, according to one count, that now it's 23 of 32 have, are now spending that 2%. I do wonder if though the rhetoric was charged and full of misinformation, whether it did actually wake up NATO as a whole, as to what its own responsibilities were in holding the alliance together.

BARANOWSKI: There is no question and there is really an agreement that Donald Trump was right, that Europe needs to spend more on defense, needs to step up, that we need to step up for our own defense. And as you said, 23 out of 32 nations are doing it right now. I'm speaking to you from Poland, that is not only spending that required 2%, but we are spending 3.2% and going to the 4.2% and going to 4.7% of GDP on defense, which is actually higher percentage than the United States.

And yes, it's true that President Trump brought this to focus as, frankly, did previous presidents, as well. Going all the way back to, I think, Kennedy at the very least, he brought it in different, more perhaps like rent terms. But it is certainly president Putin that made us really take these responsibility more seriously. And that's why you see high spending, especially on the Eastern front. But again, Europeans more broadly reaching the levels that we agreed on and, but on that point, there is appreciation, especially on the Eastern flank, perhaps, of Donald Trump bringing this to very strong attention of everyone in the Alliance.

CHAKRABARTI: Now I wonder, we'll talk more about how Europeans view Vice President Harris a little bit later in the show.

But I've been using this blanket term, Europeans, but obviously it's a very diverse continent and within that we've also seen a rise of kind of right-wing populism in Europe, just as we have in the United States. And obviously thinking of Hungary, Italy, even President Erdoğan in Turkey.

I just, I wonder there, there must be some European states that are more aligned with a future Trump presidency than misaligned.

BARANOWSKI: That's certainly true. We began speaking about security, and in that context, we can talk about Europeans as a group, because for everyone who is at NATO and most of the European countries are, with the exceptions of really few, it is critical to have us involved in European security.

But when we look to domestic politics. Yes, there will be alignments with Donald Trump. If he was to win elections in the U.S. you pointed out to Hungary where Victor Orban, prime minister of Hungary, works very closely with the President Trump's team, also perhaps sharing some lessons from Hungary over the last few years. But there are also right-wing parties, especially right-wing parties, more nativist parties, sovereigntist parties in other countries that are not yet in the government, but that would certainly be aligned with the worldview. And that's true both in big countries like France and Germany and smaller countries as well, where those parties might reach the government very soon.

Part II

CHAKRABARTI: I want to shift for the moment to Latin America. And Denise Dresser joins us. She's a Mexican political analyst and columnist and a professor of political science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, and she's in Mexico City.

Professor Dresser, welcome to you.

DENISE DRESSER: Thank you. Great to be on the show.

CHAKRABARTI: So of all the foreign policy issues that are reverberating most powerfully here in the United States, it's immigration that's number one on that foreign policy list, for obvious reasons. So could you give me your analysis as to how Latin American countries are seeing the immigration debate as it plays out in the United States?

DRESSER: I think this affects a multiplicity of countries that have immigration issues with the U.S. Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, but most importantly, my country, Mexico. Mexicans are viewing this election with trepidation and with fear. Because we already lived through a Trump presidency and know what that entails.

He used the immigration issue as a cudgel to extract a series of concessions from Mexico on other fronts. And now his rhetoric has become even more inflammatory and is resonating throughout the continent. For example, he said that he's going to deport over 12 million immigrants regardless of their legal status.

That he once again is going to try and close the border. That he, in the case of Mexico, might use military force against drug traffickers, or might even bomb parts of Mexico's territory. And having lived through the four years of his last presidency, that forced Mexico to do a series of things that have placed us in a very difficult situation.

For example, Donald Trump threatened to put tariffs on a series of Mexican products, violating, by the way, the free trade agreement that exists between Canada, the United States and Mexico. If we didn't control immigration and act as a de facto border wall and as a de facto border police, and that led to the militarization of immigration policy here.

The militarized National Guard spends 90% of its time basically chasing immigrants, to the detriment of public security issues in the country, for example. And we have a new president, a woman president, and in the past, Trump was able to impose a series of things because Manuel López Obrador, who I would call an authoritarian populist, bowed to him and accepted these terms and they had a good relationship. Because they spoke the same language, had a similar temperament, and Trump was willing to look away from Mexico's democratic backsliding over the last six years.

So this was a kind of pact with the devil. And we, Democrats in Mexico, are concerned about the resurrection of that pact and also about the relationship that could emerge between a man like Donald Trump, and we know how he tends to treat women and how he would interact with our new female Mexican president.

CHAKRABARTI: So let me follow up on a couple of things there. Because these are very important points. So first of all, Mexico's new president being Claudia Sheinbaum and but she, at least, through the Mexican election was very closely aligned with López Obrador, right? Do we know clearly what her view of border issues are between Mexico and the United States?

Or has she spoken about it in sympathetic terms to what came before in Mexico?

DRESSER: She has not expressed a very clear stance. I think the situation in Mexico and in Latin America right now is we're holding our breath to see what happens. In some ways, Trump coming back into office would be functional for her in so far as the U.S. kept silent on democratic backsliding and her close alliance with López Obrador and her pushing forward his agenda on a series of issues that many of us consider threatening to Mexico's very fragile democracy, that might work well for her. What wouldn't work well is Trump stands, for example, on unilateral moves regarding drug trafficking and violence in Mexico.

There was a reason, the incursion to find a very notorious Mexican trafficker and take him to the U.S. And arrest him and she's adopted a stance of national sovereignty, of defending Mexico against U.S. incursions and of supporting some of the issues. That López Obrador left on her plate that are clear violations of Mexico's international commitments under free trade.

So I think trade issues, tariffs, protectionism, immigration are going to be key. And that's why there's so much concern, because of Trump's previous stances. And also because of the alignment that Claudia Sheinbaum may have with him. Or not, I think it's a big question mark.

CHAKRABARTI: Yeah, that's a very important form of uncertainty to understand in Mexico itself.

In a minute or two, I want to talk about the rest of Latin America, but sticking with the Mexico-U.S. border for a moment, Vice President Harris was charged by the Biden administration to look at specifically what the United States could do to reduce migration from other Latin American countries.

And in terms of, we've heard for a long time about increasing the economies and the safety of people in those nations, such that the need for migration would be reduced. There's no measurable difference between before her taking on that task and now, so I do wonder what you think about a potential Harris presidency, whether that would be a functional change, if at all, to this really complex and challenging issue of Western hemispheric migration.

I'd say that in Latin America, Kamala Harris is unknown. People are not going to come out and tell you what they understand her legacy to be or what she did, because there seems to be, as you said correctly, no major difference. In this approach of going to the source of immigration, the push factors has not worked. Because unfortunately, we're seeing a trend in many countries in Latin America towards authoritarian populism.

And, for example, that has been the case now for many years in Venezuela. And that's pushing people out, basically the collapse of the Venezuelan economy and insecurity in many other areas that has to do with the region's lack of growth and inability to really reemerge economically after COVID.

Many analysts in Mexico are talking, and in the region are talking about perhaps another lost decade of economic growth. And I'd say that's the primordial push factor. I'd say economic collapse. Also, insecurity, violence and drug violence. The region is plagued by the strengthening of criminal organizations and the rerouting of drug trafficking roots throughout the hemisphere, and how that's affecting domestic politics in many places, and it's not clear to us that the U.S. actually has a solution for this. Because as these drugs come from Colombia or Mexico to the U.S. Market. The United States is the main source of demand, and we're not seeing anything that's going to change that equation under either presidents.

And the question for Kamala Harris, she willing to go to really take a comprehensive look at immigration, beyond what the Biden administration did? Which was basically continue with the Trump pact of, we'll be silent on democracy issues in Mexico as long as you stop immigrants from crossing the border.

CHAKRABARTI: Yeah. Michael Baranowski, I know you're still there listening patiently with us. I do have an important question that reflects the issues of Latin America in the European Union. But hang on for just a moment, because Professor Dresser, there's a follow up that I want to ask you. Because as, look, in the United States, about the view of Americans is quite, there's a broad spectrum of views about those push factors, as you were talking about.

And I think a growing number of Americans, in fact, we know a growing number of Americans say it's not the U.S.'s business to try and clean up the messes in some of these Latin American countries that are producing those push factors. And therefore, and you could also say that in previous generations, whenever the United States decided to become more actively involved in Latin America, it succeeded in simply people in Mexico or even Latin America more broadly think of the American populace's dwindling desire to be active participants in Latin American policy and politics.

DRESSER: I understand those views, but unfortunately, they don't reflect reality. Our countries are interconnected in so many ways. And for example, the opioid crisis stems from a very high demand for the drug in the United States.

I think it's completely false to argue, as JD Vance has said, that Mexico is the main cause of this. There's a demand issue in the U.S. that is not addressed. And there's another, I think, important theme that we haven't touched upon, which is the U.S. sends guns, sells guns to multiple criminal organizations that buy them.

Along the border states and then take them to Mexico and to other countries in the region. And I think there's an enormous degree of responsibility on the part of any U.S. Administration. Now, regarding the United States pulling back. Of course, Latin American countries do not want to see interventions that topple democratic governments or that lead to military coups, which was the history of American intervention in the 20th century.

But in the 21st century, I think many thought that Biden would be true to his rhetoric and support efforts to maintain fragile democracies in Latin America. And the U.S. pulled back in a way that was, I think, very detrimental to Latin America, in so far as it just let democratic backsliding continue without taking a strong stance. And I think on those issues that have to do with democratic rule, with human rights, with climate change and with even peace negotiations in the region, the U.S. had very bad policy towards Venezuela, for example, and now is no longer a legitimate player in the region.

But that void, unfortunately, and I'm glad you brought this up, has been filled by the increased presence, economically, in terms of investment, of China. And China is willing to do business with autocrats in Latin America and the government growing geopolitical presence as well of Russia, that is intervening in Latin American elections, pushing polarization, pushing fake news and trying to support authoritarian alternatives throughout Latin America.

CHAKRABARTI: So we will hear, when we talk about Africa in a few minutes, we'll probably hear an echo of that theme. Professor Dresser, Michael Baranowski, let me turn back to you. And again, I appreciate your patience on this, but I did want to ask you about the question of migration in the European context. Because obviously I would say that it's been thorny, to put it lightly, in Europe.

And in fact, mass migration is one of the things that has helped empower those far-right nativist parties and groups in Europe that we were talking about earlier. So walk me through how the sort of migration issue in the Western Hemisphere, how Europeans may look about that, look upon that, and then, considering similar issue, similar situation in Europe, in the context of the U.S. election and what might happen there.

BARANOWSKI: Migration is certainly one of the key central issues. Political issues in Europe, as well. It seems to be a global phenomenon or at least a phenomenon in the West. So it's very high on the agenda, as you said, and the issue is being vilified and used especially by right wing parties.

Now, at the moment there, and there are two sources of migration, perhaps three for Europe, South, Southeast and also East, being the war in Ukraine. That created millions of displaced people. Now all this is playing into the hands of right-wing populists.

And some of this rhetorics gets picked up also by more center right governments or parties. But that's one area where it seems to be not directly impacted by who wins in U.S. election, the narratives and politics are similar, but the decisions that United States can take are a little bit more disconnected with one difference, and the difference relates directly to the war in Ukraine, because If U.S. was to pull out and pull back the support and it would create a loss in Ukraine, loss of the war, then we would see a wave of additional millions of Ukrainians who will have to flee. And that would certainly have an impact on Europe as well.

CHAKRABARTI: So I hear your point that there may be a much more insignificant direct impact of the U.S. president on European migration issues, obviously in comparison to Latin America, but earlier you talked about the fragility of some democracies in Europe, and I wonder if the rhetorical impact, or the example, say Donald Trump is returned to the White House, and he does institute his incredibly hard line on immigration, could that further empower or provide an example for the very parties that you're speaking about in Europe?

BARANOWSKI: Certainly. But the impact is perhaps a little bit broader, because it's more about what Donald Trump would do within the whole context of U.S. democracy, it's institutions, especially rule of law. Immigration and migration debates as well, that would have a very profound impact on Europe, because American democracy remains the example also for our democracies here in Europe and for democracies around the world.

CHAKRABARTI: Yeah. So this brings us back to I think, your overall point, I should say, which is that there is a massive tension between what might be an advisable, truly advisable U.S. foreign policy versus what it sounds like candidates feel like they have to say or the postures that they have to take to project strength in the course of a U.S. Yeah. election, right?

That ultimately they, the candidates, if they win, may feel the need to follow through on some of the promises they made, but those promises weren't with thinking actually, this would be a good thing for the U.S. to do abroad. I also wonder, though, if that tension leads us naturally to candidates like Donald Trump, one of his appeals to his most fervent supporters is his constant supposed projection of strength, and that now has come along with a very absolutist foreign policy as we saw under his first administration, if we're all always voting on vibes, that seems to be a natural conclusion in terms of the kind of candidates we'd get.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, and it's no secret that the Trump campaign wants to highlight the candidates perceived leadership strength and that does seem to be an asset for him. So a Gallup poll taken two weeks ago showed that Trump had a 10-point lead nationally in terms of who would be a stronger and more decisive leader.

The poll from the Institute for Global Affairs showed Trump had an eight-point lead in battleground states on who would be a stronger leader in international affairs. So the history suggests that kind of image resonates with voters. I think this is a place where we can help make sense of Trump's appeal to voters, even if his foreign policy positions are unusual. So a lot of Trump's America First policies. For example, in this election, the idea of placing double digit tariffs on all imports is quite outside the mainstream for U.S. foreign policy. And when asked if voters agree with those positions, they generally say no.

So if we thought that individual foreign policy issues were what mattered in the politics of foreign policy, It would seem like Trump's America First agenda is a bad thing for him politically, but if you think that Trump, like many other candidates, uses his foreign policy positions as a way of crafting an image of being a strong and decisive leader, then we can see that kind of strategy resonates with exactly the strategies many other presidential candidates have taken in the past.

And I think that's one place where Trump, even though he's often seen as being outside the norms of U.S. politics, has actually been hewing to a strategy that has a lot of historical background to it.

CHAKRABARTI: We just have a couple of minutes left here, and I want to bring it back to Vice President Harris, because you write very interestingly that, quote, an upcoming election can make the task of resolving international crises both more urgent and more difficult.

Now I'm thinking about Israel-Gaza, and you heard that tape a little earlier we played from Harris's DNC speech, where she promised Israel, Israeli security and a Palestinian state as well. Those are promises she's making in the context of an election, as you pointed out. But on the other hand, if she wins the White House she will be dealing with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has said, he and those surrounding him have said, in no uncertain terms, the hope for a two state solution is gone.

Is this one of those examples of, it may be making it much more difficult to resolve this international crisis? Because what incentive would Netanyahu have to negotiate in good faith with a new president who said she wants a second, she wants a Palestinian state?

FRIEDMAN: I think that's right. History shows that the dynamics of an upcoming election can make it very difficult for presidents to negotiate in foreign policy.

And in this case, the clear block is that Netanyahu has every incentive to roll the dice and hope that Trump is the next U.S. president. Trump has been very clear that he wants to let Israel, quote, finish the job in Gaza. As you talked about earlier in the program, it's not exactly clear how Democrats would try to straddle support for Israel with empathy towards Gaza, but it's clear that would come with, a Trump administration would have fewer constraints for Israel than a Harris one would.

And as a result of that, Israel has very little incentive to try to tamp down the war before the election. At the same time, the Biden administration presumably doesn't want to alienate pro Israel voters. And that makes it difficult for them to take much more aggressive positions in the short term.

I would say, if Harris wins the presidency, then she would have much more freedom to put constraints on Israel if that's what she wants to do. But I think it makes a lot of sense that any of those constraints would have to wait until after Election Day, just given the difficulty of straddling that those two constituencies in the Democratic party right now.