What a second Trump term means for the world

The war in Ukraine. A trade battle with China. 'Mass deportations' to Mexico. How are Europe, Mexico and China preparing for Donald Trump’s return to the White House?

Jessica Berlin, senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Mariana Campero, host of the “Mexico Matters” podcast from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Senior nonresident associate in the Americas Program at CSIS. Former CEO of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations.

Yangyang Cheng, fellow and research scholar at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center. Frequent columnist on Chinese politics and U.S.-China relations.

Part I

MEGHNA CHAKRABARTI: What does a second Donald Trump presidency mean for the world? Meeting with European leaders in Hungary last week, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Trump's close relationship with Russia's Vladimir Putin won't erode his country's resolve.

ZELENSKYY: It is up to Ukraine to decide what should and should not be on the agenda for ending this war.

CHAKRABARTI: In Mexico, President Claudia Sheinbaum also reassured her nation.

SHEINBAUM: To all Mexicans, there is no reason for concern. To our fellow citizens, their families here, Mexican businesswomen and businessmen, there's absolutely no reason to worry. Mexico always moves forward. We are a free, independent, and sovereign country, and there will be a good relationship with the United States. 

CHAKRABARTI: And in China, Mao Ning, with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave this statement to the media.

Quote:

President Xi Jinping has congratulated U.S. President-elect Trump. President Xi Jinping pointed out that history has shown that both sides of China and the U.S. gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation.

A stable, sound, and sustainable relationship serves the interests of both countries and meets the expectations of the international community.

End quote. Now, of course, who Americans put in the White House does have a very large impact on the rest of the world. So today we are going to focus on how Europe, Mexico, and China are preparing for Donald Trump's return. And we will begin with Ukraine and Europe. Jessica Berlin joins us. She's senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and she's in Berlin, Germany.

Jessica, welcome to On Point.

JESSICA BERLIN: Hi, Meghna.

CHAKRABARTI: Right after the announcement that Donald Trump, now President-elect Donald Trump, had won the election last week, what was your first reaction?

BERLIN: Over here, I think the reaction could be summarized with the word dread. Whether people are identifying on the more liberal or conservative end of the spectrum was not so much as issue, rather than the sense that Donald Trump is an unstable and [destabalizing] factor in international affairs. As was experienced during his first administration. And also, of course, for Europe.

He's made very clear signals that he doesn't have great faith in the NATO alliance. ... So there's certainly a great deal of concern over here. That being said, however, it's always been clear throughout this election that second Trump administration was perfectly possible. And likely, the polls were very close, and it was clear that he might indeed win a second term.

So also, governments here have been preparing and even if they're not thrilled necessarily to be faced with this situation, they will get on with it. And European relations with the United States go far beyond any one president. So we are allies. Our economies, our national securities are intertwined and that doesn't change just because of this election.

CHAKRABARTI: Yeah, history is much longer than one presidency. Point well taken. But focusing on Ukraine for a few moments here, Jessica. As the president-elect during the campaign repeatedly said that he would end Russia's war in the Ukraine in quote, 24 hours. Didn't really say how he would do that.

Sometimes he said he could just pick up the phone and make one phone call. But, however, I'm seeing here that just yesterday, Finnish President Alexander Stubb had a call with President-elect Trump, and following that call, he told Bloomberg, so this is a report from Bloomberg, that the Finnish President said that he advises Europe to take seriously the intentions of Trump to get a peace deal sooner rather than later.

Now, I don't think there were more details in terms of what Trump said to Stubb, but your response to that?

BERLIN: Donald Trump talks a lot. That'll be the first thing I say. We need to take his statements with a grain of salt. As you said, yourself pointed out, the fact that he says that he wants, that he could end the war with a phone call on day one. That's quite, that's a lot of big talk, but it won't be possible, and he knows it.

So I think statements like this are coming from a space of him trying to position himself to be able to look like he's upholding his promises and doing what he says, but reality will very likely be quite different. First and foremost, the United States will not decide the end to this war.

Russia and Ukraine will determine when they stop fighting this war. And of course, Russia could end the war tomorrow. By leaving Ukrainian territory, that goes without saying. That being said, Trump calling Russia or Ukraine and telling them to make a deal is not going to make them accept that deal. And even if Trump would take some sort of drastic radical step and stop delivering aid to Ukraine, that doesn't mean the rest of the world would.

Certainly, doesn't mean Europe would. And it certainly doesn't mean that the Ukrainian people would stop fighting. They also have a flourishing defense industry that has only grown during this conflict. Would it be incredibly damaging? Yes. But would it end the war on day one? No, and as Trump reaches out to other world leaders and European leaders, he will certainly continue to make statements, and the media cycle will jump on them and try to interpret them.

But as we know from the last Trump administration, he is very unpredictable, things he says one day, change the next. I think what we'll need to do is consider these statements in their context. What is Trump trying to convey? What is his short-term goal in this situation? And for the case of European leaders, and of course, in particular for Ukraine.

They'll have to try to frame America's engagement with European states and on Ukraine aid as transactional and a deal, as long as Trump and his administration always feel like they're coming out the winner and having a good deal, quote-unquote. I think that'll be the path forward.

CHAKRABARTI: Can I just jump in here, Jessica?

BERLIN: Statements like this don't hold very much weight.

CHAKRABARTI: Yeah, point well taken. I think there's a profound difference between grandiose statements made during a campaign in any country, but especially in the United States, versus the real politic of ending a war. But in terms of reality, yes, obviously a war is not going to come to a conclusion on January 20th, just because there's a different president of the United States.

But if we put some pieces together here, today in the U.S. the news is that it's highly likely that Trump will name Senator Marco Rubio as his desired Secretary of State. And Marco Rubio as senator voted against a $60 billion U.S. aid package for Ukraine. That package did pass in April of this year, but Rubio voted against it.

And just after Trump's election, he also said that he thinks, Rubio said this, that he thinks the war in Ukraine has reached a stalemate and needs to be brought to a conclusion. Again, speaking in terms of reality, if that is the U.S.'s posture going forward, what impact might that have on any peace negotiations as they play out between Russia, Ukraine, and the various European states that would be involved with that?

Would that put pressure to come to a conclusion that perhaps is not, or a deal, as you say, that's not to Ukraine's liking?

BERLIN: It'll certainly put Ukraine and Ukraine's allies under pressure. They'll be needing to show wins on the battlefield and momentum, because then the framing to the incoming administration will need to be, look, if you want to end this fight sooner, give us the aid to do it.

This is the quickest way to victory, and the quickest way to peace, is by supporting us, and not by cutting and running and forcing us into --

CHAKRABARTI: Jessica?

BERLIN: Excuse me. The connection just dropped.

CHAKRABARTI: Yeah, just dropped. We got you back. Thank goodness. Continue. Go ahead.

BERLIN: So that will push them into accepting a peace treaty with Russia, that is really actually just setting up the board for Russia to rearm and to strike again. So Ukraine will certainly be under pressure to deliver wins and above all Europe, European allies will be under pressure to aid Ukraine more.

That, however ... and it has everything to do with European countries' own complacency and inaction over these past eight years. All since the first Trump administration, it was clear that this day might come. And we might face a U.S. government with or without Trump in the White House. That is no longer heavily investing in European defense.

So we over here, we do need to step up. We've squandered eight years of time to do so when the writing was on the wall back then.

CHAKRABARTI: Yeah. Can I just jump in here, Jessica?

BERLIN: So I think that pressure will just increase.

HAKRABARTI: Yeah. And forgive me for interrupting. I'm just a little, feeling a little more aggressive in my questioning because of the instability of the line, that's all.

But I want to just note that today, the current Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, is heading to Brussels, or is expected to be in Brussels, to have talks about exactly this. Is there a possibility, I know there's some European analysts who are saying maybe the thing to do is to try to advance some kind of peace deal before Donald Trump takes office again.

Is that a sense that's realistic in Europe?

BERLIN: So it's certainly something that's circling and that's being discussed. But it is not realistic. Because this is the decision of the Ukrainians. And when we talk about deal, let's just be clear, what a lot of these politicians mean is Ukraine should sacrifice territory that is currently occupied by Russia in exchange for a ceasefire.

That would be like if the U.S. and Mexico were at war and Mexico was occupying half a dozen U.S. states along the southern border and to say for peace, we're going to let Mexico keep those states and make the Americans living on those occupied states live under Mexican rule from now on, because then we'll have a ceasefire.

And just as ridiculous as that sounds to you and your audience, that's exactly how ridiculous that sounds to Ukrainians. They say we're not going to abandon our people and our land.

Part II

CHAKRABARTI: There's a lot of overlap in terms of considerations that various nations have to make with a new Trump presidency. And now on that note, I'd like to bring in Yangyang Cheng.

She's a fellow and research scholar at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center. Yangyang, it's wonderful to have you back on the show. Welcome back.

YANGYANG CHENG: Thank you so much.

CHAKRABARTI: Okay, so let's focus a little bit on the U.S.'s foreign policy role in terms of foreign conflicts. And the reason why I want to start there is what do you estimate the reaction is from the Chinese government, from President Xi, that Donald Trump for years now has been saying, he doesn't want to be involved in any wars.

He can stop a war in Ukraine with a phone call, real or not, but his essentially, his tacit support of Russian president Vladimir Putin. Does President Xi see that as a sign that the U.S. wouldn't intervene if China decided to increase its aggression towards Taiwan?

CHENG: This is a really great question, and it's also a complicated one because the U.S. government, with regards to its policy towards Taiwan, in light of this election outcome, is fragmented. On one hand, there is the long-standing Republican base and the foreign policy staff, the establishment that are very pro Taiwan. And some of that signals are also seen in times of Donald Trump's staffing choices with Mike Waltz for national security advisor, as you mentioned, Marco Rubio for secretary of state.

And these are very hawkish individuals who have traditionally been very pro Taiwan. Of course, to serve in the Trump administration and to stay in that position, often it is more important to be loyal rather than to be policy consistent in terms of policy. And we saw some of that in terms of these individuals rhetoric towards Ukraine, as well.

So there is an uncertainty. On the other hand, there is also a growing isolationist faction within the Republican Party, partly represented by Vice President elect JD Vance. And to an extent, their voter base are also what pushed the ticket into power. And then we saw, for example, this year, the Republican GOP convention platform was the first time since 1980 that did not mention Taiwan explicitly.

And so that is notable as well. And of course, for the most important factor is probably still Donald Trump himself. And then we see how he often speaks of Taiwan in such a transactional tone that is less in Taiwan as a strategic partner or in terms of Democratic values, but more as this kind of weaker pot that can be extolled for protection money. And of course, these are all things that Beijing is observing and then there is also a wild card that is Elon Musk. And to an extent, Vladmir Putin. And we do know that, for example, Elon Musk has somehow told like SpaceX suppliers to move out of Taiwan, out of geopolitical uncertainty.

There is also being reported that Vladimir Putin reportedly passed on messages from Beijing to Elon Musk on to not activate the Starlink satellite system as a favor to Xi Jinping. So these are on very uncertain elements. And of course, China is watching and seeing what are the opportunities there.

CHAKRABARTI: Yangyang you always bring the entire package to the table. Wow. That was a lot. Jessica. At the core, one of the things that Yangyang is pointing out here is not just in terms of Donald Trump's claims about being more isolationist, but what that might mean in reality. And so I wonder what the view from Europe is, vis a vis China, that if indeed the U.S. sort of steps back a little bit, however that might be, from the world stage, how do the Europeans look upon that regarding opportunities or relationships or even threats from China?

BERLIN: This has multiple dimensions that Yangyang very thoroughly pointed out. And ultimately, she's right. From the American side will be transactional, on the European side, not so different.

It's also quite transactional here. A lot of leaders and parties across the European continent are looking more at their economic interests and the threat of economic damage on the domestic front. If we have falling outs with China. But on the other hand, we're dealing with very real and present security threats coming from China in terms of espionage and disinformation.

Election interference and even sabotage. Also, of course, we've seen that the Chinese --

CHAKRABARTI: Oh, that line just keeps dropping out. Jessica Berlin, Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, I do apologize for the instability of our connection to you there in Germany, but thank you so very much for joining us. Okay, Yangyang, let's then redouble our focus on China here. I want to play a clip of tape from Donald Trump.

This is something he said in October of 2024 regarding Taiwan specifically, and it was during his, it was actually at the tail end of his three-ish hour-long conversation on Joe Rogan's podcast.

DONALD TRUMP: Taiwan, they stole our chip business. Okay. They want us to protect, and they want protection. They don't pay us money for the protection.

The mob makes you pay money, right?

CHAKRABARTI: Yangyang, what do you think of that?

CHENG: It's a very Donald Trump line and it's probably not surprising in terms of he was on Joe Rogan's podcast. So he was speaking to a certain faction of the Republican base. So this was a domestic messaging and to appeal to these kinds of economic populism.

And I think you're actually, that's a generous, I'll be honest, I think that's a generous interpretation of it. I actually think that he's telling the absolute truth about how he looks at the purpose and use of U.S. diplomatic efforts or even the U.S. military, as transactional.

CHENG: Yes. And I think one thing is first of all, like Taiwan did not steal the chip business from the United States. That is a factually incorrect statement. And however, it does see where Donald Trump sees as potential leverages, right? Of course, the Taiwanese government has announced that it's going to make new weapons purchases from the U.S. On the other hand, there is also potentially more pressures on the Taiwanese chip industries and other industries to invest more in the U.S. and Taiwanese, on government and industries, may make these strategic calculations as a way to shore up its support in the U.S.

CHAKRABARTI: Okay. So there's one more thing specifically about Taiwan that we should look at, because obviously given Trump's considerably successful theatrical approach to politics. There's a lot of focus on what he says, but this time around, for the new Trump presidency, we actually have evidence of what he has done, from his first presidency between 2016 and 2020, there is a path of action to analyze.

So about that, we spoke with Oriana Skylar Mastro, she's a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and she focuses on Chinese military and security policy. And she says President-elect Trump has said things that make it seem like he would abandon Taiwan if China invaded.

But when it comes to things he has actually done, strategically, it's hard to say what Trump would do in the next presidency.

ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO: What he has said and what he has done gives you like the complete opposite picture. He has said things like, Taiwan should prepare for their own defense or Taiwan should pay for their defense. 

But during his administration, he was the most forward leaning on the defense of Taiwan than any other previous administration, he sold them offensive equipment, which had never been approved before. The arms sales, the support and passing of legislation for high level visits. The Chinese thought it was less that he was pro Taiwan and more that he wanted to stick China in the eye about Taiwan stuff. He more recently said, Oh, the Chinese wouldn't dare do anything about Taiwan because Xi knows that I'm expletive That's crazy.

CHAKRABARTI: That's Oriana Skylar Mastro at Stanford. Yangyang, that's very interesting to me, the divergence between what Trump says and what he has done. Your analysis of that.

CHENG: So I think there are two layers to this. On one hand, there is Donald Trump speaks differently towards different audiences and at times he also self contradicts.

On the other hand, I think it is also very important to note here that there is a difference between increasing military spending and increasing military equipment to Taiwan, and being pro, actually being for Taiwan security. And that is a very important distinction. What is asking Taiwan to spend more on military, to purchase more U.S. made weapons are not necessarily good for the safety and security of the people of Taiwan. On the other hand, it is good for, on one hand, the defense industry in the U.S., on the other hand, as a rhetorical tool to show up to the Republican party base that are still taking a very hawkish line against China.

And so I think there are important distinctions here in terms of whose interests are actually being centered.

CHAKRABARTI: Okay, very good. Very important nuance there. When it comes to the actual interaction between leaders of the major powers of the world. I think that really matters to understand that dynamic when Oriana there said that Trump insists that China wouldn't quote dare do anything crazy about Taiwan, because Xi knows, President Xi knows that Trump would go crazy. I'm wondering , is that actually accurate? How does President Xi or let's say the Chinese Communist Party see Donald Trump as a leader?

CHENG: First of all, I think with regards to Beijing's attitude and policies to Taiwan, who is in the White House is not the deciding factor.

The important things, these are deeply historical issues with regards to national identity and historical narratives, that are central to the Chinese Communist Party's rule, and that is the underlying factor, and who is in the White House is a secondary factor. And secondly, with regards to Donald Trump, I think it is interesting, because if we see how Beijing has reacted right after the election or around the election.

That on one hand, there is an overall consensus within the Chinese intelligentsia. And to an extent, the Chinese public, is that no matter who occupies the White House, there is a consensus that the United States is going to be hostile towards China. And so the Chinese people and the public need to prepare for that hostile environment.

On the other hand, Donald Trump being on one hand, transactional on the other hand, being erratic for a certain kind of opportunities that the Chinese leadership may be able to see. And the Chinese leadership act like the Chinese government and state media has made some interesting gestures, for example, it's as you showed early on the show, President Xi Jinping congratulate Donald Trump very early on. And the Chinese, there's an ultra-nationalist, a Chinese blogger that has just being banned on Chinese social media for one year as an interesting signal.

The People's Daily, the party's newspaper published an article on commemorating the flying tigers, the U.S. fighter pilots who fought in China during World War II, right after the election. And these are of course very small gestures. So one shouldn't over interpret them, but it still marks a certain distinction compared with almost four years ago when Joe Biden just took office and there was a very hostile first, a high-level meeting in Alaska between the Chinese and the U.S. leadership.

And so I think it is interesting to see here is that I think the Chinese leadership is trying to present itself as a responsible actor on the world stage. On one hand, it is to the domestic base, on the other hand, to other countries in the world with the anticipation that, that the U.S. government is going to act harshly towards China in Trump's first term, Trump's second term. And in that case, the Chinese government is still going to retaliate, likely.

CHAKRABARTI: I wish that everybody in Washington that works on U.S. policy would listen to you, because Yangyang, what you said about the longer historical arc that drives Chinese decision making, plus the stance that China sees regardless of who's in the White House, very critical to understand.

Okay but one way, direct way in which who is in the White House can have an immediate impact is on trade, right? Because in the U.S., the president can decide to institute or reduce tariffs. Thus far, all we know is that Donald Trump has said his desire is not only to institute across the board tariff to all imports coming into the United States, but even up, up to 60% tariffs, tariff on Chinese imports.

He could do that, he doesn't need congressional or legal approve or judicial approval to do that. So how do you think Chinese leadership is thinking about that?

CHENG: The Chinese, because Donald Trump has been saying that for a while on the campaign trail, and of course he initiated a trade war with China during his first term.

So the Chinese leadership is to an extent anticipating these kinds of outcomes. And towards a domestic policy, it has been on for a very long time and somewhat also independent of U.S. policy, trying to shore up domestic production and domestic consumption, the so-called dual circulation policies. Of course, it has certain difficulties and obstacles within implementation in China.

And of course, there are domestic issues with regards to economic stagnation and demographic issues in China. But these trade war rhetoric in China towards China are not going to catch the Chinese leadership by surprise. On the other hand, it is also very important to understand that the people who are the ones who are going to bear the cost of the trade war is not Xi Jinping or the top leadership.

It's going to be Chinese workers and consumers, and very importantly, U.S. workers and U.S. consumers.

CHAKRABARTI: Yes. Okay. Pick up on that thought, because we've had a lot of discussions on this show about how in terms of when those imports arrive in the United States, it's American workers and consumers that are absolutely going to pay the price.

Elaborate a little bit about how, what the impact could be on Chinese workers and consumers.

CHENG: Some of the evidence we've seen during Trump's first trade war, there are certain companies that have relied on manufacturing for export that are seeing negative impacts on their business, including workers being laid off and such.

But then, of course, the Chinese economy on one hand, it is very large. On the other hand, so there is a lot of domestic capacity. On the other hand, it is also very nimble, including like Chinese entrepreneurs and workers themselves are very flexible in times of responding to specific geopolitical changes and adapting their policies. And also during when the pandemic happened, actually a lot of these exports from China to the U.S. had increased because a lot of U.S. consumers at home were purchasing these small goods from Amazon, coming from Chinese manufacturers and the Chinese manufacturers were picking up these consumer signals from the U.S. very quickly.

Part III

CHAKRABARTI: I want to bring Mariana Campero into the conversation now. Mariana is host of the Mexico Matters podcast from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and she's senior nonresident associate in the Americas program at CSIS. Mariana Campero, welcome to On Point.

MARIANA CAMPERO: Thank you so much for having me.

CHAKRABARTI: So you know, at the very top of the show, sticking with the issue of potential changes in trade, when we played that clip from President Claudia Sheinbaum, she did go out of her way to say Mexican businesswomen and businessmen, there's no reason to worry.

Huge trading partner. Mexico is, with the United States. Can you talk about why she, why President Sheinbaum felt the need to say that to the Mexican people?

CAMPERO: Yes, absolutely. I think just by judging the reaction that we saw in the Mexican markets, the Mexican peso fell to a two year low right after the election of President Trump. So there was a lot, and there is a lot of uncertainty going on in Mexico. And as we know, uncertainty is the number one issue that paralyzes investments. Meghna, as Mexico is, has become the United States' largest trading partner. But we have a $152 billion deficit with the United States, more or less.

And we also know one thing is that President Trump doesn't like deficits. And he said that one of his favorite words in the world were tariffs. He has threatened to impose tariffs. And there is a renewal of the USMCA agreement coming up in 2026. Which if we are all betting woman, that I think that renewal is going to become into a renegotiation, because we also know that he has been very clear as to what he wants.

And when he talks about tariffs, when he talks about immigration, when he talks about border security, even when he talks about China. All of those avenues actually lead to Mexico. And we also know that President Trump is very transactional. And as we saw last time, he's actually willing to use the terror, the threats of tariffs and the threats of canceling the agreement all together in order to get some concessions in the other areas that he cares about. So if I were President Claudia Sheinbaum right now, I will certainly be thinking about what could Mexico do to offer, and offer President Donald Trump, in order to avoid the cancellation of USMCA or the imposition of tariffs.

CHAKRABARTI: So we're going to come back to that... in a second, because it's really important. But Yangyang, again, I'm trying to thread together the views from different parts of the world here. And just first of all, as a reminder, USMCA is the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which replaced NAFTA in 2020.

But, Yangyang, I'm wondering about what China thinks about the potential change again in U.S. posture regarding its desire to be on the world stage, because one thing that China has done incredibly effectively over time is pour a lot of investment into places like Africa, for example. Is it possible that the CCP sees potential increased avenues into the Western Hemisphere with a more, let's call it, Mercurial American leadership.

CHENG: Yes, absolutely. And we've seen that the Chinese leadership has been making certain gestures towards traditional U.S. allies as well in light of the election as a potential way to seize this opportunity. And speaking of trade, one thing that Donald Trump has repeatedly also threatened is to revoke China's most favored nation trade status. And we also heard Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that would be a violation of WTO, World Trade Organization rules.

And so it is really interesting to see the Chinese government as somehow abiding by and standing up for international organizations and multilateral rules, while painting the United States as an increasingly nationalistic and isolationistic power.

CHAKRABARTI: No, go ahead, Yangyang. I didn't mean to interrupt. Go ahead.

CHENG: Oh, no, of course. And of course, the world is not just the United States and China. And also not just traditional U.S. allies versus countries that are close to China. There are also a lot of other countries that the Chinese government has been trying to make inroads with, as you mentioned.

Countries in Africa, countries in the broader developing world. And of course, these are not necessarily ideological or strategic alignments, but there are a lot of potential economic opportunities, and these are opportunities that Beijing is trying to seize, especially in light of this election result to present itself, not necessarily as rewriting the world order, or these kind of liberal democratic institutions, but as a way to take advantage of certain gaps and to be able to help the Chinese economy on one hand. On the other hand, on to bolster the Chinese leadership's legitimacy both at home and on international stage.

CHAKRABARTI: Yangyang, fellow and research scholar at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center. Always a pleasure to have you, Yangyang. Thank you so much.

CHENG: Thank you so much.

CHAKRABARTI: Okay. Mariana. Thank you. let's get back specifically to Mexico, because you said something very interesting about the due to the transactional nature of Donald Trump's, president-elect Trump's leadership, Mexico or President Sheinbaum might be thinking about things that could offer him. The big, the immediate question comes up about would she consider making any kind of offers, concessions, changes regarding Mexico's northern and Mexico's southern border?

CAMPERO: If we go back to 2018, we have seen a similar picture before, right? Back then, President Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Mexico, if Mexico didn't cooperate in curbing the migration flows. And what the result of that was, is that then President López Obrador, in fact, started cooperating, Mexico sent its National Guard to guard our own southern border.

Moreover, Mexico started to cooperate with the United States in a program that had never been done before, which is the Remain in Mexico program, in which Mexico accepted to have a foreign national stay in Mexico while they waited for their own cases in the asylum cases in the United States to be adjudicated, that program was later removed.

But so he succeeded by threatening to impose tariff trade, to get concessions from the Mexican government in other areas. So I would think that president Claudia Sheinbaum today is expecting something similar. That President Trump will threaten, and that Mexico is going to have to do something about it.

Particularly because what we know is that President Trump 2.0 is much more powerful, stronger, and better prepared, particularly when it comes to his plan to deport millions of illegal residents, right? Of those, about, according to some estimates, about 5 million of those are Mexicans. And there are other 5 million or so that are not Mexicans.

And I would be, if I were in the Mexican government right now, I would start thinking about what Mexico could actually do in order to receive Mexican nationals. And if we're going to be forced to receive other nationals, or maybe Mexico will try to be a mediator with Venezuela or Cuba in order to have those nationals return to their own home.

There are many avenues in which the Mexican president should be thinking right now, what would be possible.

CHAKRABARTI: So about this Trump plan for mass deportation, again, just to note, this time around, it does seem as if he's seeking to put people in his administration that will carry out some of his campaign promises.

He recently announced that Tom Homan, who used to be the head of ICE is going to join the Trump administration as border czar, right? And of course, Homan was a leader in the family separation policy. under the first Trump administration when he was at ICE. So Mariana, you just said something very almost disturbing, right?

That the possibility of this is so real that you believe the Sheinbaum administration in Mexico has to start thinking about what it would do if several million Mexicans and perhaps even other foreign nationals were sent out of the United States and into Mexico. That's no small thing.

The impact on Mexico could be profound.

CAMPERO: Absolutely. I think the impact on Mexico could be profound, not only because the Mexican economy right now is growing at less than 2%. Right now, imagine, that Mexico will receive, I don't know, right? Sort of the numbers, you can think 100,000, to 100,000, 1 million, 3 million nationals.

The impact could be enormous, not only because of the migration, but also last year, Mexican nationals living in the United States sent $64 billion in remittances back home, which you really help support consumers. So imagine that you'll reach, Mexico will receive X number of its own residents.

And in addition, we will lose, or Mexico will lose the remittances of all these people's work working in the United States. So it could certainly be an enormous impact on the other side. You can argue, and this might be a very optimistic scenario, is that the people that will come back are people that are hardworking.

There are people that are having an entrepreneurial spirit, and that they will come back to Mexico, and that it could be a demographic boom. Maybe a very optimistic scenario. But sort of Mexico certainly has to start planning for a likely scenario that a lot of Mexicans and maybe non Mexicans will be returned home.

CHAKRABARTI: So when we talked with Jessica Berlin about European view right now, she actually said something, which I thought was pretty important, but unfortunately, her line was a little shaky. She said that that a new Trump presidency will force European leaders who had been a little too passive, she said, in the past eight years, to really stand up and do more for European security and the European economy.

And of course, we heard Yangyang talk about President Xi in China, his long view of Chinese ambitions, not just in Asia Pacific, but in the rest of the world. In a sense, these are unexpected potential opportunities, let's put it that way. Mexico, of course, has the distinction of sharing a border with the United States. So the relationship is much deeper, much closer, much more constant and intimate. But I wonder, is there any potential opportunity for Mexico, with a new Trump administration?

CAMPERO: Yes. And just before I answer that question, let me just give a sense of the size of the border, right?

Sort of, what are we talking about? It is the busiest border in the entire world. We have 350 million legal crossings per day. There's 57 points of entries and we trade per minute about 3 million. So this is enormous. And regarding to the opportunity that may lie ahead. I do believe there is an opportunity if and only if President Claudia Sheinbaum were to see it this way.

I think the opportunity lies in, it is also in the interest of Mexico. To control its own border, not only for migration purposes, but also it is in the interest of Mexico to cooperate with the United States in reducing the flow of fentanyl and the power of the cartels that are controlling about 30% of Mexican territory.

So, because people, when you read the news is, Oh my God Trump has threatened to bomb the Mexican cartels. I think that is certainly an exaggeration, but I don't think he's not serious when he says that border security will be improved and that the power of the cartels has grown.

To levels that is causing havoc, not only to Mexico, but also to the United States.